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**FUEHRER
CONFERENCES**


**On Matters Dealing With
the
GERMAN NAVY**

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1944

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Foreword

1. The present volume entitled Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1944 is the third of a series to appear, the 1942 and 1943 conferences having been published previously. When the series is completed, all important conferences between the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief, Navy occurring during the war years 1939-1945 for which records have been found will be available in English. The documents translated in this volume are the result of notes taken for the Commander in Chief, Navy during his conferences with the Fuehrer. After these notes were subsequently typed, they were signed by the Commander in Chief, Navy, in this case Admiral Doenitz. There is a noticeable gap in Fuehrer conferences from 21 July to 13 October 1944. This may at least in part be the result of the attack on the Fuehrer's life on 20 July of that year.

2. The over-all purpose of these translations is to provide materials which may be used as a basis for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The references given for each conference denote the microfilm reels and sections thereof on which the documents may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records and Library.

3. In the publication Fuehrer Conferences, 1943 the Secretary of the Navy invited attention to the following items of particular interest, which are also applicable to this volume:

- a. The function of a joint command.
- b. The role of air power in naval warfare.
- c. The result of domination of the Navy by military men unfamiliar with the rudiments of sea power.

Thos B. Inglis

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13 January 1944

Commander in Chief of the Navy

Minutes of the Visit of the Commander in Chief, Navy
at Headquarters Wolfsschanze on 1 to 3 January 1944.

The Commander in Chief, Navy spent 1 to 3 January 1944 at Fuehrer Headquarters. He had many discussions on the current problems of the war with some of the leading personages, as well as with the Fuehrer himself in private.

He reported to the Fuehrer on the following matters in particular:

1. The course and the results of the engagement of the SCHARNHORST in the Arctic Ocean thus far, explained with the aid of a battle sketch.

Just as Lt. General Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff had done on a previous occasion, the Fuehrer fully agreed with the idea that the Navy should make every possible use of its forces. However, the thing that grieves him, aside from the unsatisfactory outcome, is the unanswered question of how the task force commander could have made the grave error at 1223 of assuming that he was confronted by heavy ships, when only enemy cruisers were involved.

Our battleship, in fact, ran away from the cruisers, although it was superior to them both in fighting power and armor. The Fuehrer always suspects that such happenings occur because too much thought is given to the safety of the ships as in the case of GRAF SPEE.

The Commander in Chief, Navy explained to the Fuehrer that the engagement had proven that surface ships also are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment. We cannot expect our ships to be very successful in preventing enemy landing attempts, since the enemy has the equipment and is in a position to eliminate our ships beforehand, or to fight them during the approach. Therefore much better results might be achieved by using the fleet for operations against convoys in the North and not as a defense against enemy landings. Moreover, for reasons of strategy it is important to maintain our strength in the North, because this influences British invasion plans and also has some effect on the situation in the Pacific.

Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy gave orders to look into the possibility of transferring the heavy cruiser PRINZ EUGEN to the task force in northern Norway.

2. The problem of the Baltic Sea is likewise to be viewed in the light of the new submarine weapon, because the Baltic Sea is the only training area for the new offensive U-boats.

The Fuehrer was fully aware of the problem. He said that the situation in the South compelled him, nevertheless, to withdraw troops from the North, and that he was trying to replace them with Latvian and Estonian divisions. Fortunately it so happens at the moment that the Russians are not very strong in the North. Everything depends on checking the Russian offensive on the southern part of the eastern front and on holding the Crimea. If the front can be stabilized in the South, forces would become available also for the North. The Fuehrer therefore remains firm in his determination not to yield an inch if he can help it. Nevertheless it should be kept in mind that our forces in the North are so weak that we have to retreat if the Russians attack.

During this visit of the Commander in Chief, Navy, Minister Speer reported to the Fuehrer on the new submarine construction program, i.e. the progress made so far in the prefabrication of Electro-Submarines.

Finally, the Commander in Chief, Navy took this opportunity to have a far-reaching discussion between Minister Speer and himself on the one hand and the Reichsmarshall on the other, for the purpose of bringing about strict centralization of all German facilities and resources in the field of high frequency technique. This discussion was to prepare the way for a later decision to this effect by the Fuehrer. For the same purpose, a demonstration of electrical equipment had been held earlier before the Fuehrer for an hour, with a lecture by Dr. Lueschen, Chairman of the Central Committee for Electrical Engineering in the Ministry of Armaments and War Industry. A report made by Professor Kuepfmueller to the Fuehrer and arranged by the Commander in Chief, Navy and Minister Speer also was in the same vein. It dealt with the problems of location in naval warfare.

To bring about this centralization, the Fuehrer is planning to give Dr. Lueschen the necessary full powers over all developments in the field of electrical engineering, in addition to his other duties. Furthermore, this authority is meant to give the "Deputy for Electrical Engineering" as far-reaching an influence on research as possible.

During the discussion with the Reichsmarshall, serious differences of opinion occurred at first. These were cleared away mainly because Minister Speer came out in support of the needed centralization and the measures suitable for bringing it about.

The Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commander in Chief, Air reached complete agreement. When the Fuehrer inquired, they informed him accordingly.

Minister Speer and Dr. Lueschen subsequently proceeded to draft the text of the authorization called for by the decision reached, and to work out matters of organization detail.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Comdr. Pfeiffer

24 January 1944

High Command, Navy

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy with the Fuehrer on 18 and 19 January 1944 at
Headquarters Wolfsschanze.

Accompanied by Rear Admiral Wagner.

1. 18 January 1944. 1300. Conference on the situation with
the Fuehrer.

a. During the report on the air situation, the Fuehrer brought up the question of the anti-aircraft defenses of Pola. He referred to a letter from Gauleiter Greiner who discussed the heavy damage caused by the air raid on Pola with the remark that reconstructing the Pola shipyard would be a hopeless effort so long as no improvement is made in the anti-aircraft artillery and pursuit plane picture, since the enemy is at present complete master of the situation.

The representative of the General Staff of the Air Force, Major Buechs, announced that anti-aircraft batteries had been transferred from Fiume to Pola, and that the whole question of air defenses in Istria was now under consideration by the General Staff of the Air Force.

b. The following was announced: A Croatian Colonel who up to now had been liaison officer to the German liaison staff in Croatia fled with his wife in a Dornier 217 which we gave to Croatia and he probably joined the British. He possesses a thorough knowledge of the military situation in Croatia.

Note: This incident throws light upon the reliability of the Croats and should be kept in mind when their services are used

2. 18 January 1944. Report to a small group by the Commander in
Chief, Navy after the conference on the situation.

a. Supplies to the Crimea. The Commander in Chief, Navy believes that the Navy will be able to ship 45,000 tons per month to the Crimea provided that enemy interference does not grow appreciably. In the spring, shipments will possibly increase to about 50,000 tons per month (cf. contents of Annex 1, page 9, which do not, however contain numerical data in detail).

The Fuehrer believes that the Army's request for 2,500 tons per month from April on is probably too high (cf. Demiansk and Stalingrad). He will have them checked.

b. The Commander in Chief, Navy requests the Fuehrer to make a decision concerning the departure of four blockade runners

for Japan, which has been planned for the next new moon phase beginning on 22 January 1944. He reports on all vital points in Annex 2, and in concluding expresses his belief that the advantages will outweigh the great risk involved.

The Fuehrer considers that there is also imminent danger that tungsten shipments from Spain and Portugal might cease. He has therefore given orders to bring in as much tungsten as possible now. He no longer considers the need for rubber decisive enough to the war effort to justify the enterprise; buna tires, if not driven at speeds over seventy kilometers an hour, last 40,000 kilometers as compared with only 20,000 kilometers in the case of rubber tires. On the whole he does not consider the economic factors really worth-while. He believes that the plan has so little chance of succeeding that even the importance of supporting Japan plays no part here, since the ships will never reach that country anyway.

He decides that no surface blockade runners are to leave port, and thereby specifically abandons all intention of importing raw materials from Japan in the future with surface blockade runners.

c. The Fuehrer agrees to the construction of fifty midget submarines as planned, and considers the development of both the mine-carrying and torpedo-carrying types correct.

d. The Fuehrer approves the construction of one man torpedoes which according to the report of the Commander in Chief, Navy are to be used particularly as a defense weapon in case of enemy landings.

e. The development of the concrete coastal defense mine (R.M.K.) and the plans for using it have the Fuehrer's emphatic consent. (Annex 3)

f. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the new explosive for torpedoes developed by Oberregierungsrat Dr. Buchmann. The Fuehrer expresses full approval. He is convinced that more can be achieved by improving the explosive than by increasing the charge. (Annex 4)

g. The Commander in Chief, Navy suggests to the Fuehrer that the solution to the problem of monitors in the Danube and the Black Sea lies in mounting two 10.5 cm guns on each of the next six artillery barges (A.M.F.P.), the essential parts of which are to be armored. The Fuehrer agrees.

h. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the plan of using radar spar decoy buoys ("Thetis"-Geraete) in the Bay of Biscay and in the Atlantic. The Fuehrer approves this measure.

i. The Commander in Chief, Navy informs the Fuehrer about the optical improvement of the night vision aiming periscope (Nachtzielsehrohr).

j. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that there is a possibility of attempting an attack on a convoy in the North

Atlantic in the near future with submarines equipped with 3.7 cm anti-aircraft guns. We will have to concentrate our weak air reconnaissance at the proper time and place. On the other hand, there is danger of an Anglo-Saxon landing in Portugal for which our submarines might then be too late. The submarines would be occupied approximately three weeks by the operation against the convoy, and during this period would require about nine days to reach Portuguese waters.

The Fuehrer believes that there will be more obvious signs when the enemy intends to land, and gives his consent for the convoy attack.

3. 18 January 1944. The Commander in Chief, Navy and Lt. General Jodl have a brief discussion concerning the shipyard in Odessa on the basis of a telegram from the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Chief Supply and Administration Officer, Section QU 2 East B Report No. 00341/44 Top Secret and filed under Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Section 264 Top Secret (OKW/WFST Qu.2 Ost B Nr. 00341/44 gK.(A I 264 GK.)).

The Commander in Chief, Navy states that he must build submarines in Odessa, and this is possible only if the shipyard comes under definite German management. He has the Fuehrer's consent for this, but can get no satisfaction from the above answer of the Armed Forces High Command. Lt. General Jodl believes that the Chief of the German Military Mission in Rumania, Lt. General Hansen, can put the matter through in our favor only if he is assisted by Navy experts capable of refuting Rumanian counter-arguments. The Commander in Chief, Navy therefore decided to speak with Mr. Merker first and then to send two experts, one for shipyards and one for submarine construction, to Lt. General Hansen to see that our demands are realized.

4. 18 January 1944. Noon and evening. The Commander in Chief, Navy was invited for dinner and supper with the Fuehrer.

5. 18 January 1944. 2230. Evening conference on the situation.

No particular questions were discussed.

6. 19 January 1944. 1100. Telephone call from Field Marshal Kesselring to the Commander in Chief, Navy.

a. The Commanding General Armed Forces, Southwest proposes that the Navy turn over her intended construction projects in the Italian area to the Organization Todt, as did the Army and the Air Force. The Commander in Chief, Navy agrees to examine the proposal.

b. The Commanding General Armed Forces, Southwest requests personnel for naval coastal artillery.

The Commander in Chief, Navy replies that the personnel problem is a bottleneck in the Navy and that no promises can be made.

He will have an investigation made, however.

c. The Commanding General Armed Forces, Southwest requests more submarines for the Mediterranean.

The Commander in Chief, Navy replies that new submarines are being continuously sent there and will be sent there in the future.

7. 19 January 1944. 1300. Conference on the situation with the Fuehrer, followed by a report of the Commander in Chief, Navy concerning measures taken by the Navy against an invasion in the Western Area.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reviews in general outline the fleet and defense forces available in the western area from the Polar Coast to Spain, the plans for using them, the mine situation, and the plans for future use of mines. The following particulars are brought out:

a. The Commander in Chief, Navy mentions that he intends to transfer the PRINZ EUGEN to northern Norway in February. The Fuehrer receives the information without special comment.

b. The Fuehrer shares the view that our cruisers cannot be used against enemy landings in the Channel-Holland area. In addition he considers cruiser operations in the Skagerrak hardly possible, especially since a high percentage of the crews are officer candidates for submarines. The loss of such personnel would jeopardize the development of the submarine service.

c. In answer to the report of Commander in Chief, Navy that drafting emergency units also from Group A would cripple part of the training program and therefore handicap the development of the submarine service, the Fuehrer replies that when taking these measures the greatest consideration must be given to submarine requirements.

General Jodl later requests that only such units be designated belonging to Group A as can be used without injury to the submarine service. The Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the whole question be reexamined, bearing in mind that decisions on the use of training vessels and emergency units must rest with him, and that a general alarm will take place only in case of a large-scale attack in the Skagerrak-Jutland area.

d. The reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine fields planned for spring is in the Fuehrer's opinion particularly important.

e. The Fuehrer wishes to be informed about the feasibility of using pressure mines (DM-Minen) as a defense against enemy landings. The Commander in Chief, Navy declares that their use for defense directly off our coast is not practical, since small landing craft have too little displacement and larger ones approach the coast at too slow a speed to activate the detonator. The use of the mines for this purpose, in contrast with their use off the enemy coast, is therefore not advisable.

f. The Fuehrer inquires about the surface speed of

the new submarine types when the electric motors are used. The Commander in Chief, Navy replies that their surface speed is fifteen knots per hour, and thus because of the fishlike shape of the vessels is actually less than their underwater speed. The Fuehrer suggests corresponding tests with the older boat types. The Commander in Chief, Navy intends to come back to this question at the next Fuehrer conference.

g. The Fuehrer expresses particular anxiety concerning a possible landing in the area South of the Gironde.

8. 19 January 1944. The Commander in Chief, Navy was invited for dinner with the Fuehrer.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Comdr. Pfeiffer

Data on the Crimean Supply Situation as of 15 January 1944

A. Available Ship- ping Space	BRT	Freight Tons	Additions Expected
13 freighters	25,442	30,610	1 ship of 3,900 BRT by the end of January 1 ship of 3,900 BRT by the end of March
3 war transports	2,502	1,200	1 ship of 834 BRT some time during the first quarter of the year
8 tankers	5,732	7,059	
33 lighters	---	20,000	
1 train of barges		300	
11 auxiliary sailing vessels		1,650	2 ships after completion of repairs, about the middle of February 60 ships of 300 BRT each beginning May 1944 un- til the end of 1944
66 landing craft of 80 freight tons capacity each.- About 40 of these are fully sea- worthy		3,200	6 ships in January 1944 9 ships in February 1944 10 ships in March 1944 12 ships in April 1944 12 ships in May 1944 10 ships in June 1944 10 ships in July 1944 7 ships in August 1944 6 ships in September 1944 5 ships in October 1944

These ships are being built
in Vienna, Linz, and Varna.
The necessary materials
have been allocated and
there is sufficient ship-
yard capacity.

Other Additions:

Concrete ships and concrete barges will be available beginning in mid-1944. These ships have not been tested.

150 French freight barges	These ships are being transferred from France and Belgium by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. It is expected that they will not begin to arrive in the Black Sea until the end of March 1944.
25 French tank-carrying barges	
30 Seine River tankers	

No transfers from the Aegean Sea are to be expected. At present 2 freighters of together 3,200 BRT are being transferred to the Black Sea, but 1 freighter of 3,700 BRT (steamship PETER) will have to go to the Aegean Sea in return.

B. The shipping space available can handle an average of 45,000 tons per month, provided that no losses occur and that the cargo space is fully utilized. There must be no bulky goods, etc. A somewhat lower transport volume should be expected in wintertime. The newly constructed ships that will be added to our fleet will enable us to raise the total to approximately 50,000 tons per month next spring, provided that there are no losses.

<u>Present Transport Requirements:</u>	<u>Actual Accomplishments to Date:</u>
Nov. 1943 - - - - -	46,054 tons per month
Dec. 1943 48,500 tons per month	about 37,894 tons per month
Jan. 1944 54,500 tons per month (reduced to 44,500)	15,920 tons from 1. Jan. until 10 Jan.
Feb. 1944 66,500 tons per month	
Mar. 1944 67,000 tons per month	

C. German Naval Forces	Ready For Action	Additions:
<u>Submarines:</u>	6 (3)	15 boats Type XXIII. 2 boats a month, beginning next May at the earliest.
<u>PT boats:</u>	10 (5)	3 large PT boats are on their way 6 coastal patrol boats, being reconverted in Linz 2 coastal patrol boats under construction in Germany
<u>Motor minesweepers:</u>	16 (13)	1 motor minesweeper (large type)
<u>Motor minesweepers of foreign origin:</u>	4 (--)	-----
<u>Auxiliary mine-sweepers (motor fishing vessels and motor boats):</u>	20 (about 10)	-----
<u>Large submarine chasers:</u>	8 (4)	including 5 war transports 8 war transports; about 6 of these in the first half of 1944
<u>Small submarine chasers (converted fishing craft):</u>	27 (about 15)	4 converted fishing craft by March 1944
<u>Landing craft:</u>	66 (about 40)	87 landing craft (Compare Par. A)
<u>Artillery barges:</u>	-- (--)	6 are on their way
<u>Monitors (equipped with two 10.5 cm. guns each):</u>	-- (--)	6 are planned; will begin to arrive in April or May.

<u>Naval artillery</u>			
<u>lighters:</u>	2	(--)	not ready for action
<u>Siebel ferries:</u>	--	(--)	6 have been transferred to the Aegean Sea
<u>Harbor patrol ves-</u>			
<u>sels:</u>	41	(?)	
<u>Mine detonating</u>			
<u>vessels:</u>	2	(?)	
<u>Other auxiliary</u>			
<u>vessels:</u>			

D. Bulgarian Naval Vessels:

- 4 torpedo boats
- 7 PT boats
- 10 motor minesweepers
- 3 minelayers
- auxiliary vessels

E. Rumanian Naval Forces:

- 4 destroyers
- 3 torpedo boats
- 3 gunboats
- 3 submarines
- 7 PT boats
- 1 minelayer and auxiliary vessels

F. Turkish Naval Forces:

- 1 battle cruiser (23,100 t)
- 2 light cruisers { 3,300 t, 3,800 t }
- 6 destroyers { 1,250 t }
- 2 gunboats (840 t)
- 10 PT boats
- 5 minelayers

G. Russian Naval Forces:

- 1 battleship (23,000 t)
- 2 heavy cruisers { 8,500 t }
- 2 light cruisers (8,030 t, 6,600 t)

5 or 6 destroyers (1,300 t - 1,700 t)
2 torpedo boats (740 t)
11 fast minesweepers
about 30 submarines
3 gunboats
about 70 PT boats
about 50 patrol boats (subchasers)
12 armored motor boats
2 minelayers
about 200 landing craft
1 river monitor

Berlin 14 January 1944

Naval Staff, Operations Division
Fuel and Supply Section

Decision on advisability of continued use of surface
blockade-runners.

- I. Besides the military factor the following must be considered:
- a. The raw material situation
 - b. Exports to Japan

Concerning Ia, The Raw Material Situation:

These arguments are based on data furnished by:

1. Bureau of Naval Armament
2. Reich Representative for Rubber (Mr. Friedrich)
3. Commission for Refined Steel (Dr. Hoffmann)
4. Opinion of the Chief, Special Staff, Mercantile and Economic Warfare, Armed Forces High Command

A. According to the above authorities there is no need to import tin from East Asia by surface blockade-runners until transport submarines Type XX begin to become effective in October 1945. (Cf. Tables 1 and 2.) The discrepancy between the total requirements and German home production plus European imports can be made up from existing stock piles and from imports by combat and Mercator submarines. (Cf. Table 1, numbers 8 and 11.)

B. The tungsten situation is also such that there is no need for using surface blockade-runners. This, however, remains true only so long as imports from Spain and Portugal remain at their present level (Cf. Table 1, number 5); and so long as combat submarines utilize fully the possibilities for transporting tungsten as advised by the Naval Ship Construction Division, Over-All Planning and Construction Branch, Submarine Section.

C. An examination of the natural rubber situation shows that if the OSORNO comes into port and submarines bring in the expected small quantities (Cf. Table 1, number 11), the amount of natural rubber available for admixture with buna and for other essential purposes will be about 250 tons a month until the transport submarines begin to be effective.

However, as the Reich Representative for Rubber points out and the Chief, Special Staff, Mercantile and Economic Warfare confirms, it is absolutely essential to import considerable amounts of natural rubber for the following reasons:

1. If the small amount of about 250 tons of natural rubber per month as mentioned above is to be sufficient, the quality of the finished products, mainly of tires, must be lowered.

2. The loss of buna producing plants, as well as of factories which produce rubber goods, can be compensated only by the increased use of natural rubber, due to the following reasons:

a. Stock piles of finished goods to counterbalance losses in production are not available in sufficient quantities.

b. There is no possibility of substitution in the buna industry. All three existing plants are producing at full capacity; a fourth plant, which will be completed some time this year, will also be needed to cover current needs.

c. The only possible way to make up losses in synthetic rubber is by raising the amount of natural rubber used in buna production, thus improving the quality and thereby extending the durability of the product. This would reduce consumption. In addition, a larger proportion of natural rubber would simplify the manufacturing process and thus increase production of the finished product.

d. The reduction of synthetic rubber production puts a greater stress on the repair factor, and repairs require almost exclusively natural rubber.

To provide against the possibility of reduction in synthetic rubber output, which is quite possible since the three existing buna plants are vulnerable to air raids, it is absolutely essential to build up a reserve of natural rubber. This is only possible, however, by continued use of surface blockade-runners until transport submarines can be put into service for this purpose.

Buna plants:

Schkopau (near Merseburg)	6,000 tons per month capacity
Huels (Westphalia)	3,000 tons per month capacity
Ludwigshafen	2,000 tons per month capacity

Under construction:

Auschwitz (Silesia)	3,000 tons per month capacity
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Concerning Ib, Exports to Japan:

The Chief, Special Staff, Mercantile and Economic Warfare emphasized that it is essential to export to Japan by surface blockade-runner even at considerable risk. These ships carry export articles which are meant to strengthen Japan's weak armament potential, things which can only be shipped by surface vessels because of their size, such as samples of tanks, anti-tank guns,

machine tools, heavy loads of structural steel for shipbuilding, etc.

Furthermore the Chief, Special Staff, Mercantile and Economic Warfare advocates the continuation of blockade-running for psychological reasons, since the maintenance of continuous German-Japanese contact is considered by Japan as one of the bases of German-Japanese collaboration.

signed: Wagner

Survey of Raw Materials					
1.			1.	2.	3.
2.	Raw material		Natural rubber	Tin	Tungsten*
3.	Yearly requirements	tons per year	3,000	7,000	1,920
4.	Quantities obtained per year	German sources	---	3,960	430
5.		Imports from Europe	---	600	1,320
6.		Total	---	4,560	1,750
7.	Deficit per year	tons per year	3,000	2,440	170
8.	Stocks on hand at beginning of 1944	tons	4,700	6,700	190
9.	Deficit expected by Oct. 1945	tons	5,500	4,500	315
10.	Imports from Far East required till Oct. 1945	tons	800	---	125
11.	Imports from Far East expected till Oct. 1945	tons	800-1,000	1,000-1,500	150-180

*If tungsten concentrate is made the basis of calculation these figures should be approximately doubled.

Construction program for freight-carrying submarines Type XX (30 boats)			
Year	Month	Number of boats to be commissioned	Number of boats theoretically available
1945	Jan	2	-
	Feb	2	-
	March	1	-
	April	2	-
	May	1	2
	June	1	4
	July	1	5
	Aug	1	7
	Sept	2	8
	Oct	3	9
	Nov	2	10
	Dec	2	11
1946	Jan	2	13
	Feb	2	16
	March	2	18
	April	3	20
	May	1	22
	June	-	24
	July	-	26
	Aug	-	29
	Sept	-	30

Other data on Type XX boats

1. Carrying capacity per boat
 - 450 tons of rubber (outside the pressure hull)
 - 190 tons of tin (inside the keel and below the upper deck)
 - 110 tons of ore, etc. (in the boat)
2. Cruising range 20,000 nautical miles
3. Length of voyage to the Far East 65 to 70 days
4. Cruising speed 10 knots
5. Speed 5.5 knots
6. Length of stay in the Far East 25 to 30 days
7. Duration of round trip 170 days

Berlin 8 January 1944

Mines Department

Coastal Mines

The necessary instructions with regard to this coastal mine were transmitted in the middle of November by the High Command, Navy, Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacle Branch to the authority in charge of developments, the Minelaying Experimental Command. The suggestions and contributions of the Naval Staff and Group North form the basis for these instructions.

According to the Fuehrer's decision, the Army engineers will take over coastal protection wherever defensive weapons can be transported to their final destination by land vehicles; this includes areas dry at low tide. Defensive weapons that have to be laid from ships are the concern of the Navy.

This mine (RMK Standard Coastal Mine) weighs one ton, runs on wheels, and can be laid from any vehicle that is equipped with standard mine tracks. The mine consists of a large concrete block with a 70 kg charge embedded in the center; in addition it has a rod with either a lead horn or an upper contact horn attached to the top. The whole mine is from 2.50 to 2.75 meters high.

Production: This mine needs only 127 kg of iron and is furthermore of the simplest conceivable construction. The heavy concrete parts can be manufactured near the place where it is used. Everything essential for mass production has already been ordered, and the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate hopes that the requested 25,000 units can be delivered by the end of March.

Beginning of Delivery: End of February.

Comparative Effectiveness of New Underwater Explosives					
Charge	Density	Thrust in comparison with TNT		Box model values	
		weight being equal	volume being equal	in contact	from a distance
TNT	1.58	1	1	2,560	860
Guncotton 18	1.77	1.55	1.67	3,009	1,832
Guncotton 36	1.80	1.89	2.02	3,060	2,630
Guncotton 39	1.70	1.53	1.75	3,510	1,957
50% TNT/ 10% 60/40 RDX/ TNT/ 5% Ammonium ni- trate/ 35% Aluminum	1.90	2.05	ca 2.50	3,700	3,100
50% TNT/ 10% RDX/ 40% Aluminium	1.87	2.12	ca 2.50	3,730	ca 3,100
10% Ethylene- diamindini- trate/ 32% Ammonium ni- trate 8% Sodium ni- trate 10% RDX/ 40% Granular alumi- num	ca 1.90	ca 2.40	ca 2.90	(4,000)	4,040
30% RDX/ 35% Aluminum/ 35% Ammonium nitrate	ca 1.65	ca 2.30	ca 2.40	4,170	---

Commander in Chief of the Navy,

Minutes of the Visit of the Commander in Chief, Navy
at Fuehrer Headquarters Berghof on 26 and 27 Febru-
ary 1944.

A. The Commander in Chief, Navy was present at the conference on the situation 26 February 1944 and reported to the Fuehrer as follows:

1. The submarine operation against convoys on 18 Febru-
ary.

Using a map, he explained that our air reconnaissance must be sure to contact enemy convoys at the exit of the North Channel; later contact is too uncertain because the convoys are likely to scatter, either to the North or all the way around to the South. On the other hand, the submarines cannot take up positions close to land because enemy air patrols are too strong there, even at night.

These two circumstances make it necessary that our own reconnaissance be extended over several days, probably about five.

With the limited forces at our disposal it is possible that our own air reconnaissance is lacking in the decisive night preceding the actual night of the attack, just when final dispositions of the submarines must be made. On this account the submarine formation in the operation under discussion did not succeed in moving submerged farther South the day prior to the night of the attack. The result was that the convoy was contacted only by the southern end of the submarine formation on the night of the attack, and only very late, so that the boats were not able to close in before dawn. At dawn, however, the boats had to submerge on account of strong carrier-based plane protection. They were immobilized and the operation came to an end.

Nevertheless, this case shows clearly what prospects the submarine type XXI would have had. With this type it would have been possible to shift the location of the boats sufficiently while submerged, even on the day preceding the night of the attack. Besides, these boats would not have been immobilized after the attack, but could have continued the operation under water.

Our general tendency to change over to underwater tactics is thus correct in every respect. We will always be at a disadvantage on the surface due to the enemy's air superiority and his surface location-finding devices, so we must avoid them by submerging.

Taking everything into account, a fundamental defense by the enemy against a submarine operating while submerged is hard to imagine. Of course, it could possibly be detected by listening devices, but their range is not anywhere near so great as that of the high frequency location-finding equipment used in air-

planes against submarines operating on the surface. It still holds true today that a ship is sunk if the submarine is able to close in. The difficulty lies in getting close enough to the target, because this still has to be done on the surface. With the new submarine it is possible under water.

Since the new submarine has great chances of success, the intended construction program must be accelerated in every way possible.

The Fuehrer agrees wholeheartedly.

Unfortunately, however, construction has already been delayed two months for type XXIII and one month for type XXI. The main reason is the damage done to the electric motor industry at the Siemens-Schuckert plant by the latest air raids. Nevertheless, everything that is humanly possible is being done in close co-operation between the Bureau of Naval Armament and Minister Speer.

The same is true for the rest of the naval construction program, the realization of which must be striven for just as fanatically. Already the mine situation at the entrances to the Baltic Sea is a cause of great anxiety to the Commander in Chief, Navy. Enemy pressure against our coasts and sea routes will certainly increase greatly during the coming year. For this reason the Navy will go through a critical period up until the time when the program ordered by the Fuehrer in April 1943 for construction of defensive vessels, such as minesweepers and motor minesweepers, begins to take effect. This program has to be completed with all possible speed. All the submarines in the Baltic Sea are of no use if the entrances cannot be kept open, not to speak of the danger to the quite considerable ship traffic, now 1,730,000 freight tons a month, which has to move through the western part of the Baltic. It goes without saying that the enemy intends to blockade us with mines in those waters.

In order to realize the naval building program, the Commander in Chief, Navy will exert himself to the utmost to provide the necessary personnel, to have them trained promptly, and to prevent their possible use for other purposes.

2. A report on the distribution of submarines as of 15 March 1944 with the help of two maps.

The Fuehrer was in full agreement with the distribution of the forces.

3. Plans for establishing a base for naval forces, involving pier construction, in the Sea of Azov are explained with the help of a map.

The Fuehrer agrees. He keeps the map to inform Marshal Antonescu personally of this measure. At the same time he stresses his anxiety that the Russians will land in the Crimea by way of the Sea of Azov.

4. The development of a submarine base on Lemnos is out

of the question because neither the Balkan railroad nor ships in the Aegean Sea can provide adequate transportation facilities. The Bay of Mudros, which alone has natural protection, has a flat coast, so that underground galleries are impossible there. We have had to abandon concrete and overground construction for the submarine base intended at Salonika, because it would require 65% of the 45 vitally important trains allotted the Navy monthly in the Balkans to transport the necessary material. In place of these we now plan underground galleries in Volos. Concrete construction at Mudros is out of the question.

In principle the Commander in Chief, Navy is of the opinion, nevertheless, that a well fortified Lemnos directly in front of the Dardanelles would be of the greatest strategic value.

The Fuehrer agrees in general with the report. He directs, however, that the value of the Mudros Bay be kept in mind, and suggests that it might be used even now as an unprotected base for PT boats.

5. Intended use of Captain Grossi's men.

It is necessary to transfer the men to the Italian theater; to use an Italian unit in the West seems no longer proper because of the danger of enemy landings, even though this was intended originally.

The Fuehrer agrees with this and asks about the dependability of Captain Grossi and his men.

The Commander in Chief, Navy declares that Captain Grossi proved loyal. Nevertheless, he has relieved him of his submarines, promising him replacements. He is obliged to keep this promise, thereby running the risk of being taken in by Grossi.

The Fuehrer agrees.

6. Special conditions in the Navy regarding commissioning of officers for Special Troop Service.

The Navy has no civilian paymasters but administrative officers who are regular officers. Therefore the administrative officers of the Navy cannot be made officers for Special Troop Service, as in the case of the Army and the Air Force where the paymasters are officials.

On the other hand, the Navy must relieve the high-ranking officials of their character as civilian officials, because they would have a lower status in comparison to high-ranking officials in the Army and the Air Force if the latter are transferred to the Special Troop Service.

The Commander in Chief, Navy intends therefore to commission the capable high-ranking officials of the Navy likewise to administrative officers, and thus to regular officers, so that the Navy does not have two different classes of officers in the administrative service.

Naturally such an adjustment is only for the duration of the war and is not meant to impede the transfer in peace time of all administrative officers to the Special Troop Service.

The Fuehrer is inclined to agree with this arrangement. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command, however, fears that this procedure will cause great dissatisfaction in the Army and the Air Force since the high-ranking officials in the Navy would have a considerably better position than those in the other branches of the Armed Forces.

He requests permission to examine the matter once more.

7. It would be a mistake to give over the defense of the Aaland Islands to the Navy if they should be occupied.

The Commander in Chief, Navy is of the opinion that the Navy possesses neither the forces nor the specific knowledge necessary to cope with such a typical army problem.

General Jodl expresses a different view. He thinks that in connection with the occupation of the Aaland Islands naval engagements would develop, so that it would seem expedient that the Navy should take over the command.

No final decision was reached since the Fuehrer did not consider it necessary yet.

B. Following the conference on the war situation the Commander in Chief, Navy had a short talk with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl in regard to the use of naval shore units in the West. He made it clear that these troops are stationed in the West only because there are no longer any barracks to accommodate them at home. He explained that these men have had only two months of basic training and could not possibly assume any additional tasks arising in their territory except in the case of a direct threat against the place where they are stationed.

To this General Jodl remarked that as far as he knew the Commanding General, France had only proposed a slight shifting of these units for the protection of railroads in case of an emergency.

The Commander in Chief, Navy made it very clear that it was out of the question for these naval units to take over any tasks which are in the Army's sphere. He does not intend to endanger the ship-building program ordered by the Fuehrer by the possibility of having no crews for the new ships because they have not been trained.

At this point Field Marshal Keitel agreed explicitly with the Commander in Chief, Navy. He emphasized the fact that if the Navy men really were used on land it would be simply impossible to replace the carefully selected young personnel. For this reason the Armed Forces High Command would have to support the view of the Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Commander in Chief, Navy concluded the conversation by repeating his former statement that he would under no condition permit the use of a single one of his men for other than naval

purposes.

The Fuehrer listened to this discussion in an adjoining room separated only by a curtain.

C. The Commander in Chief, Navy discussed with Field Marshal Keitel and Vegelein, the representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS, the consequences of the reorganization of the Counter-Intelligence Service.

He learned that the Reichsfuehrer SS in accordance with the wish of the Fuehrer was to build up a sort of German Secret Service. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command asked the Commander in Chief, Navy for his view on the question and the latter replied that no branch of the Armed Forces should be permitted under any circumstances to maintain or initiate any extra organization. The greatest effect could only be attained through a unified organization always ready for action. The counter-intelligence services of the different branches of the Armed Forces, so far as they do not have to be maintained directly among the troops, should in his opinion be turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS. The branches of the Armed Forces must represent their interests by having their own people in the large organization of the Reichsfuehrer SS (Organization Kaltenbrunner) which should absorb the different counter-intelligence services.

Deputy Vegelein was convinced that the Reichsfuehrer SS would approve of this proposal.

D. On 27 February 1944 the Commander in Chief, Navy took part in the conference on the situation and in the discussions with Marshal Antonescu in the guest house Gleseheim.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Lt. Comdr. von Mantey

Berlin 7 February 1944

General Administration Bureau, Navy

Memorandum for the Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command on the Development of the Submarine Program in Regard to Personnel as of 1 February 1944.

Part A.

I. Personnel developments up to the end of 1943.

1. Unfilled replacement quotas from June to December 1943:

a. On 1 January 1944 the replacements received were 22,495 men short of the number promised by the Armed Forces High Command.

b. According to the Armed Forces High Command, Draft Registration Division (OKW/WEA 10732/43 g. 24 Dec. 1943), 12,050 men were called up for induction at the end of January to fill the quota.

c. Therefore 10,445 men remain to be supplied from the 1943 quota, 30% of these technicians.

d. Since the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command promised in letter 3641/43 g.k. WFST/Org (1.Staffel) dated 23 November 1943 that the quota will be entirely and promptly filled, it is expected that the required men will be provided within a short time.

2. Number of workers not supplied in 1943 needed for carrying out the entire submarine program:

Total requirement:	170,155 men
Total allocation:	110,900 men
amounting to only 65.2% of requirement	
Number of men short of 1943 quota:	59,255 men
(Cf. Annex 1 for breakdown)	

3. Review of the situation:

a. Effect on the over-all program:

The personnel requirements for the submarine program of 1943 for submarines and sea-going units alone were: 109,568 men

In contrast, the total number allocated was: 110,900 men

Those actually received were: 100,455 men

Consequences: It was possible to cover the requirements of 11,490 men for the radio and radar program only by lowering our combat strength and by forced reductions in other places.

No personnel allocation for the needs of coastal artillery, anti-aircraft defenses, garrison and supply organizations as provided in the over-all program will be possible, not even as replacements for current losses.

Added to this is the progressive reduction of combat efficiency by the necessary personnel replacement of age groups 1906 and younger, by age groups born in and prior to 1900. This includes non-commissioned officers and technicians.

Field Marshal Rommel's reports clearly show the weaknesses in personnel.

It is intolerable that the branch of service which would bear the brunt in case of an invasion should remain cut off from personnel supply.

Again it must be made clear that losses in case of major attack cannot be replaced. We must count on losing units, so far as they cannot be reinforced from naval emergency units at the disposal of generals of the Armed Forces.

It is necessary to allocate personnel at once.

Relief of the situation from naval sources, which could however only become effective in the distant future, depends on the realization of the Fuehrer's directive of July 1943 in regard to providing 40,000 foreign workers. A renewed request has been made to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command by the Naval High Command (OKM AMA/M Wehr Tr Nr. 470/44 Gkdos. 1 Feb. 44). (Cf. Annex 2)

b. Technical personnel:

(1) The percentage of volunteers with technical skills could be increased on an average from 30 to 40 percent in the last few months.

In contrast to this, none of the quotas of reserves and replacement reserves with technical skills have been filled.

As a rule thirty percent of the personnel required must have technical training.

(2) The worst disruptions have been prevented so far by constantly reducing the allocation of technicians for the radio and radar program, by taking technically trained personnel qualified for sea duty out of motor vehicle units, and by eliminating the third fire room watch on all ships and boats.

These measures will be exhausted within a short time.

Furthermore, men such as molders, foundry men, polishers, etc., whose skills are of little use to the technical branches, had to be accepted. The result is an unmistakable deterioration in the quality of the technical personnel.

Consequences: Training based on technical knowledge, which permitted assignment to sea duty regardless of the type of engine and boiler systems, is eliminated. Specialized training for the various engine and boiler systems for assignment to specific types of ships according to training must be substituted. This makes it necessary to have a greater number of men available for unforeseen eventualities. Special action in the allocation of technical personnel is necessary. (Cf. III, 2).

II. Replacement situation in the first quarter of 1944.

1. a. Personnel requirements from 1 January to 31 March 1944.

Personnel requirements according to the submarine program as originally planned: 81,000 men

Increase in submarine and PT boat personnel requirements in accordance with the change in the original submarine program: 3,000 men

Unfulfilled demands of 1943 (Cf. I, 2): 59,255 men

Total requirements for first quarter of 1944 according to program: 143,255 men

Saving of manpower made possible by the Fuehrer directive for the home territory, so far as it can be put into effect in the first quarter: -12,800 men

Total personnel requirements for the first quarter of 1944: 130,455 men

b. If the requirements remaining from 1943 are cancelled because of the over-all Armed Forces replacement situation, the outcome is as follows:

The total personnel requirements for the first quarter of 1944 are: 130,455 men

Remainder of 1943 quota: -59,255 men

Reduced personnel requirements for the first quarter of 1944: 71,200 men

c. Allocation intended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command for the first quarter of 1944:

According to a report of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command 351/44 g dated 27 January (Cf. Annex 3) the number to be provided is 54,700 men

This includes the number of men who were already allocated in December 1943 as part of the remaining unfilled quota (Cf. I, 1, b) -12,050 men

The actual allocation thus amounts to 42,650 men

d. Comparison between personnel requirements and actual allocation during the first quarter:

Total reduced personnel requirements for the first quarter of 1944 (Cf. II, 1. b): 71,200 men

Actual allocation: -42,650 men

Remaining requirements for the first quarter of 1944: 28,550 men

2. Consequences in case the remaining requirements for the first quarter are not met:

a. Needs for the first quarter:

Submarine and sea-going personnel 47,015 men

Radio and radar program 4,831 men

Reinforcements for the Adriatic Sea and Dodecanese Islands 5,000 men

Losses and casualties 5,460 men

Requirements not including coastal defense, anti-aircraft, garrison and supply organizations 62,312 men

b. Allocation by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command up to the present time -42,650 men

This is short of requirements as shown under "a" by 19,662 men

Remarks: Aside from the allocation of 42,650 men by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command up to the present time, the 12,800 men gained by the manpower conservation program for the first quarter according to the Fuehrer's directive for the home territory will not be available, since in view of the invasion threat it is necessary to man all crewless gun batteries in the Western Area and along the western Danish coast and to bring front line units up to full strength.

Consequences:

1. The present allocation of 42,650 men by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command is not even sufficient to cover the needs of submarine and sea going units.
2. There is no personnel available for coastal and anti-aircraft defenses as provided in the program.

III. Requests for the first quarter of 1944 beyond the present allocations by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

- | | | |
|-------|--|-------------------|
| 1. a. | To fill submarine requirements according to II, 2, a, an immediate further allocation as shown in II, 2, b is needed of: | 19,662 men |
| b. | To fill the requirements for coastal and anti-aircraft defenses according to the difference between the numbers in II, 1, d and 2, b, the following is needed: | <u>8,888 men</u> |
| | The remainder according to II, 1, d: | <u>28,550 men</u> |
| | | |
| 2. | The request for manpower according to II, 1 includes the following number of technicians (for details see Annex 4): | 19,410 men |
| | | |
| 3. | Timely and complete fulfillment of reduced total personnel requirements for the first quarter of 1944 according to II, 1, b is requested: | 71,200 men |

IV. Effects in case the requests in section III are not fulfilled:

1. All further allocations of personnel made available to the defense fronts in the Western Area, Denmark, and Norway by manpower conservation in the home territory according to the Fuehrer's directive, would be stopped in favor of submarine and sea-going assignments. This would mean that further gun batter-

ies could not be manned and others could not be brought up to combat strength.

2. Requested reinforcements of anti-aircraft defenses of dock yards could not be made.

3. It would be impossible to replace losses and casualties even in sea-going units.

4. Batteries of all types which are or will be completed could not be manned.

5. The training of technical personnel would be gravely disrupted.

Part B.

The Volunteer Problem and Recruits from among the Seafaring Population.

1. The number of volunteers in the age group born in 1926 allotted to the Navy was originally set by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command at 30,000 men.

Upon objection by the Commander in Chief, Navy, the minimum requirement of the Navy was recognized as 45,000 volunteers, and the volunteer quota was revised accordingly.

Furthermore it was understood that all recruits from among the seafaring population would be available as naval replacements.

2. Developments during the fifth war year have shown that for the first time the volunteer quota allotted to the Navy was not reached. Therefore the Draft Registration Division was requested to fill the volunteer quota by draftees of age group 1926 who have not yet been assigned.

3. The directive issued by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command (see Annex 3) covers this request literally. However, it contains the unacceptable clause that the Navy may not receive any additional draftees from age group 1926 after their volunteer quota has been filled.

This phrasing can only mean that the recruits with seafaring background are now to be subtracted from the approved volunteer quota for the Navy.

This means that instead of the allotment of volunteers plus available seafaring recruits, which was obtained up to the present, the future allotment would be the volunteers minus the seafaring recruits.

An inquiry at the Operations Staff, Organization Division has corroborated this interpretation.

4. When the question was referred to him, the Chief of Staff,

Armed Forces High Command granted by telephone the allocation of recruits with seafaring background in addition to the volunteer quota in principle. The intended phrasing, which limited the allocation numerically, was not accepted by the General Administration Bureau, Navy, Recruitment Division, however. A final phrasing can be accepted only if it expresses the indisputable claim of the Navy to the exclusive use of the seafaring recruits in addition to the allotted volunteer quota of 45,000 men.

5. The above Armed Forces High Command directive points to the conclusion that the Armed Forces High Command intends to lower the Navy's share of the age group born in 1927 also, and will therefore lower the volunteer quota accordingly.

With the present need of 15,000 officer candidates from age group 1927, the Navy must demand the remaining 30,000 volunteers plus the seafaring recruits as the minimum replacements for submarine and sea-going crews.

Independent of the total requirements, the Navy must therefore demand the following:

1. Establishment of the volunteer quota for age group 1927 of at least 45,000 men.
2. No curtailment of the claim to the recruits with seafaring background.
3. No inclusion of the seafaring recruits in the volunteer quota.

Part C.

The Question of Shipyard Workers needed for repair and construction of submarines as the result of the SE-Aktion.

I. 1. The decrease brought about in the number of workers employed for submarine repair and construction on account of the SE-Aktion has led to a reduction in the number of operational submarines and has created an intolerable accumulation of submarines in the Baltic Sea which are not ready for action.

This makes it impossible to concentrate submarines at critical moments in the invasion areas as ordered by the Fuehrer. The most decisive factor of the anti-invasion measures is therefore absent.

The effect of the inductions resulting from the SE-Aktion is here so disastrous that the Commander in Chief, Navy had to order the immediate alleviation of this condition with reference to technicians regardless of the grave consequences to the development of the personnel situation as previously drawn up.

2. The actual number of those drafted into the Army and the Air Force from submarine repair and construction work is not known. Moreover it can only be a question of wrongly assigned persons since highly skilled technical personnel is supposed to

be channeled to the proper branch of the service. Experience has shown that it takes weeks, even months, to get such men released from the Army and the Air Force. In consideration of the foregoing the Commander in Chief, Navy has granted work furlough (Arbeitsurlaub) for the 2,500 shipyard workers representing the Navy's share of the draft and ordered the return of these men to their jobs within ten days after receipt of the lists.

At the same time the speedy return of 1,600 shipyard workers from the Army and the Air Force as ordered by the Armed Forces High Command on 13 January 1944 (OKW WFSt/Org Nr. 877/44 geh.) is being urged.

3. The special action requested previously for the assignment of technicians is therefore extremely urgent in order to avoid interruption of the training program and to safeguard the construction of submarines.

4. It is obvious that the efficiency of the Navy will suffer from lack of military personnel when the repair workers are returned to the shipyards; the Army and the Air Force on the other hand, are not affected by the "SE-Aktion", since their repair personnel is militarized.

Therefore the immediate increase of an additional 2,500 men is necessary.

The request for 28,550 men in A, III, 1 must be raised therefore to 31,050 men.

Comparison between the Requirements and the Allocation
by the Armed Forces High Command.

The allocation of 12,050 men at the end of January 1944 is counted as an allocation for 1943.

1. Requirements from June to September 1943: 59,845; allocated were 50,200 men. This is 85.8% of requirements.

Requirements from October to December 1943: 110,310; allocated were 60,700 men. This is 55% of requirements.

Total requirements: 170,155 men. Total allocation: 110,900 men. This is 65.2% of requirements.

Of these not received: 10,445 men
(Cf. A, I, c)

Total number of men received: 100,455 men
which is 59% of requirements.

2. Remaining requirements from 1943.

In expectation of the future fulfillment of the remaining allocation according to A, I, d, the requirements are as follows:

Total requirements:	170,155 men
Minus total allocation:	110,900 men
<u>Remaining requirements from 1943:</u>	<u>59,255 men</u>

Berlin 1 February 1944

From Naval High Command, General Administration Bureau,
Recruitment Division, Personnel Section.

To the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

Subject: 40,000 foreign conscripted workers for the Navy.

1. In July 1943 the Fuehrer approved the importation of 40,000 foreign conscripted workers for use on auxiliary depot ships or for service in the rear areas in order to release naval personnel for other duty. The Fuehrer recognized that these workers are just as important there as in war production.

2. According to a letter of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command (No. 3641/43, Gkdos.) dated 23 November 1943, attempts have been made to bring about a final solution of this affair in direct contact with the Bureau of Armaments. The conference between the Chief, General Administration Bureau and the Chief, Bureau of Armaments on making available the first installment of 20,000 men was without results. So far, not one man has been provided.

3. The Naval High Command points out again that because of insufficient replacements all allocations of replacement personnel to coastal and anti-aircraft artillery had to be stopped since the fall of 1942. On this account, as well as because of the necessity of replacing personnel fit for submarine duty with older people, of which the Armed Forces High Command is aware, this sector is progressively being weakened. Reference is made to Field Marshal Rommel's reports.

Planned replacement allocations for January to March 1944 also exclude chances for improving the situation to any extent through manpower conservation as per Fuehrer's directive of 27 November 1943.

4. The Armed Forces High Command is therefore once more requested to realize the Fuehrer's directive at least by degrees, so that the coastal and anti-aircraft defenses will not be weakened further, but will be strengthened as the situation demands.

signed: Warzecha

Fuehrer Headquarters 27 January 1944

Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command .

Subject: Filling the replacement requirements for the Armed Forces during the period from 1 January to 31 March 1944.

The replacements for the first quarter of 1944 are to be allocated to the various branches of the service by the Draft Registration Division as shown in Annex 3a.

Comments in this connection:

1. The total number of persons subject to military service classified as indispensable who could be made available by reclassification has not yet been determined. In particular, the result of reclassification of personnel in essential war industries is uncertain. Therefore the postponement of monthly installations or to some extent even the non-fulfillment of the quotas must be reckoned with.

In case of a considerable increase in persons formerly classified as indispensable, the Draft Registration Division is to submit to me through the Operations Staff a new proposal for distribution.

2. The distribution of age group 1926 is to be done on the basis of the order of 15 September 1943 (The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, No. 3761/43 g WFSt/Org (II)). Wherever the allotted quotas of volunteers cannot be reached, the difference is to be made up by draftees. Beyond their allotted quotas the Navy and the Air Force cannot be given any more draftees from the 1926 age group.

3. So far as the requirements for replacements of the various branches of the service cannot be satisfied, they must be made up by manpower conservation according to the Fuehrer's directive of 27 November 1943.

signed: Keitel

countersigned: Captain Huchzermeier

Induction Plan, Armed Forces for the first quarter of 1944.

Classification	Navy		
	January	February	March
1. Indispensible	10,500	4,500	5,000
2. Old Age Groups 1889-93	5,000	5,000	-----
3. Age Group 1926			
a. Subject to draft	-----	2,500*	4,700*
b. Volunteers	4,500	4,500	4,500
c. Untrained reserves of the physically unfit (II, F)	-----	3,000	-----
4. Others			
a. Germans from Poland and Baltic countries	1,000	-----	-----
b. Auxiliary instructors from Reich Labor Service	-----	-----	-----
	21,000	19,500	14,200

Total: 54,700

To this number must be added 2,031 men who were assigned as technicians but have no technical skills.

* if possible only members of skilled trades.

Technicians Required

1. Technicians fit for submarine and sea duty in age group 1910 and later are required as follows:

a.	30% of the reduced total personnel requirements for the first quarter of 1944 as given in II, 1, b:	21,360 men
b.	Special measures according to I, 3, b:	10,000 men
Total allocation required:		31,360 men

2. Of these, the number allotted and included in II, 1, c are:

50% of indispensables (February and March):	4,750 men
50% of draftees, age group 1926:	3,600 men
40% of volunteers:	3,600 men
So far allocated:	11,950 men

Further requirements of technicians for the first quarter of 1944 are: 19,410 men according to the remaining requirements, as shown in III, 1.

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Visit of the Commander in Chief, Navy
at Fuehrer Headquarters Wolfsschanze on 20 and 21
March 1944.

A. The Commander in Chief, Navy had several private talks with the Fuehrer. In addition, the Commander in Chief, Navy reported to the Fuehrer on the following points:

1. Only the Navy can determine the use of combat units and weapons of all types at sea. This naturally applies to high speed landing craft. It is planned to use the small battle weapon "Mohr" at Nettuno.

The Fuehrer agreed.

2. The effects of the loss of Odessa on shipping and the general situation in the Black Sea, especially on supplies for the Crimea.

The Fuehrer again emphasized that he wants to hold the Crimea. For that reason he already mentioned the consequences of its loss to the High Command, Army, telling them that Odessa must be held. The Fuehrer asked the Commander in Chief, Navy to write a memorandum explaining the importance of Odessa for holding the Crimea, so that the commanding generals of the Army would hear these things not only from the Fuehrer, but also from someone else.

3. The disastrous financial situation of Greece and its effects on ship repairs.

The Fuehrer believes that the workers should be paid in terms of room and board in order to avoid the problems of inflation.

4. The problem of the alarm units in the West.

The Commander in Chief, Navy explains in detail what the 27,000 men being trained there mean for naval warfare. He wants them to fight only for the protection of their own stations. Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel state that the Navy would get these men back. But the Commander in Chief, Navy replies that this is very uncertain, since no one has control over developments in case of an invasion.

The Fuehrer believes that, in case they should be needed, a special decision will have to be made about the disposition of the training units. He instructs the Armed Forces High Command to give corresponding orders to the various branches of the Armed Forces.

5. Attention must be given to the weakness of the anti-invasion and coastal defenses in the German Bight, even if an enemy landing there seems unlikely at the moment.

The Fuehrer promises that something will be done to strengthen

this vulnerable spot after projects in the West are completed, i.e. in the spring, by the end of April.

6. Plans for the use of naval forces on the Peipus Lake.

The Fuehrer points out that Russia would be certain to transport naval forces from Leningrad to the Peipus Lake.

7. Matters pertaining to the arrest of the French admirals.

The Fuehrer decides that the following French admirals should not be put under arrest:

- a. Those who are cooperating with us;
- b. Those whom we consider trustworthy.

The Commander in Chief, Navy is to furnish the Reichsfuehrer SS with a corresponding list.

8. Plans to use submarines more sparingly in view of the high losses, except in the event of an invasion.

The Fuehrer gives his consent.

9. Regrettably high shipping losses in the northern area.

The situation can be expected to improve only when more escort forces are available. Much too little has been built during the last few years.

The Fuehrer asked when the increase in PT boat construction would take effect.

10. Plans for placing additional available anti-submarine guns South of the Gironde for coastal defense.

The Fuehrer welcomes this. He demands, however, that the Navy extend the mine barrages in shallow waters and on the beaches in the West.

B. The extent of authority held by fortress commanders in the West (jurisdiction, disciplinary authority, etc.), was discussed with the Armed Forces High Command. The Armed Forces High Command will issue an order concerning this.

C. The Commander in Chief, Navy discussed with Gauleiter Kaufmann the plans for changes in naval transport operations in the Norwegian area.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping was in agreement. The Armed Forces High Command will issue the necessary directives.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Lt. j.g. Mommert

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy and the Fuehrer at Headquarters Berghof on 12
and 13 April 1944.

1. TIRPITZ:

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the plans for the TIRPITZ. The ship is to be repaired and to remain stationed in northern Norway. This course will be followed even if further damage is sustained. Regardless of how much work and manpower may be involved, the repairs must be made. After all, the presence of the TIRPITZ ties up enemy forces. The ship will hardly have any further opportunity for combat, unless later political developments, such as a falling out between England and Russia, were to bring this about.

In any case, it is impossible to know what will happen. It is very unlikely that the TIRPITZ will be used in case of an invasion. Air attacks have shown that a ship is helpless without fighter escort. Therefore the idea of using the SCHARNHORST during the Arctic night was basically correct. Aside from the fact that the TIRPITZ will tie up enemy forces if left in northern Norway, it would be a mistake to recall the ship to Germany, since that would increase the danger of air raids on our German ports.

The Fuehrer voices his wholehearted approval. He agrees with the Commander in Chief, Navy on every point.

2. Vis Island (Lissa):

General Jodl informs the Fuehrer that the seizure of Vis is purely a naval matter. There is a difference of opinion between the Navy on the one hand and the Army and the Air Force on the other. The latter believes that the Navy is too weak to carry out the seizure. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Vis is worth the commitment of so many valuable forces, since it is a question whether we will be able to supply and hold it afterwards. The continual interference with German coastal shipping could not be stopped by the seizure of Vis, since the airports in Foggia and the ports on the southern coast of Italy are at the disposal of the British very close by.

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that Vis is a vulnerable spot on the Dalmatian Coast. Infiltration of enemy troops and weapons is easier through Vis than straight across the Adriatic from Italy. Therefore it is important to seize Vis. Our losses of transport vessels in this area are almost always caused by enemy air forces, which attack our ships even while they are lying in the harbor. Due to the losses which occurred in the meantime, our Navy has less transport space today than it had during the middle of March. Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy believes that Vis should be taken soon. Transport space is ade-

quate. Naval escort forces will, of course, be unable to provide sufficient protection, especially in the event of destroyer attacks. Naturally, the Commander in Chief, Navy is not at all certain that the British will use destroyers. Surprise is the most important element of the undertaking. Therefore the approach will have to be well camouflaged. In addition, the Commander in Chief, Navy considers the support of our air forces as absolutely necessary for the invasion.

The Reichsmarschall is against the operation. First he asserts that the destroyers are too much of a danger. Then he claims that British planes from Foggia would appear during the landing at the latest and annihilate everything.

General Jodl says that he and the Army also consider the risk too great.

The Commander in Chief, Navy advocates carrying out the plan and taking the risk. He refers to Lero, where British destroyers, afraid of the search receivers of our Air Force, did not appear either.

The Fuehrer tends to agree with the Commander in Chief, Navy. He calls attention to the fact that the British are building an airport on Vis Island, which would make attacks on our supplies still easier. He also makes reference to the operation at Lero and its success in spite of the proximity of the enemy. On the other hand he also agrees with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command that there is great danger from enemy planes and possibly from destroyer attacks, against which our own old torpedo boats would be powerless. It goes without saying that our Air Force would have to support the operation.

The Commander in Chief, Navy believes the operation could successfully be carried out under proper weather conditions and with the aid of dark nights. An essential condition would be the ability to keep the island supplied afterwards.

The Fuehrer believes that the latter is possible, if need be with the help of submarines. He reserves the decision on the seizure of Vis until the return of the officer who was sent by the Armed Forces High Command to investigate the above matters.

General impression: The Fuehrer is inclined to agree with the Commander in Chief, Navy, but argues as follows: "If the Army is opposed to begin with, and the inner conviction is lacking, then nothing will come of it anyway."

3. Operation Against Convoys in the Arctic Ocean:

The Commander in Chief, Navy explains the part carrier-based planes are playing in the Arctic in connection with convoy operations. He points out that the submarines can no longer get near the convoys, and how close carriers have come to the Norwegian Coast. He shows how easily the Air Force could have attacked the carrier by means of search receivers and torpedoes. This would have given our submarines a chance to get closer to the convoy, and thereby provided further opportunity for destroy-

ing valuable war materials intended for Russia.

The Reichsmarschall does not want to undertake this. He doubts that carrier-based planes alone prevent submarines from approaching the convoy. He considers the carriers too far from our air bases.

The Fuehrer supports the Commander in Chief, Navy on all counts, and demands an attack on the aircraft carrier of the next PQ convoy.

The Reichsmarschall declares his willingness hereafter to transfer forces to northern Norway for short periods of time.

The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that convoys are located not more than three days in advance. It is very doubtful that this would be long enough to effect the transfer.

The Reichsmarschall believes that it would suffice if the ground installations were set up beforehand. He wants to begin work on these immediately, so that only the planes themselves would then have to be transferred. The Reichsmarschall gives corresponding orders to the Chief of the General Staff, Air.

4. Submarine Warfare:

With the aid of an English monthly report captured by the Japanese and giving data on Allied shipping losses and anti-submarine warfare, the Commander in Chief, Navy shows the great extent to which naval forces were tied up by submarine warfare as early as January 1942. His estimate for the present time is much higher. The Reichsmarschall stresses the large number of enemy air forces tied up by submarine warfare. The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that Churchill admitted in his last monthly report on submarine warfare, that an extraordinarily large number of forces is being tied up in this way. The Commander in Chief, Navy therefore believes that submarine warfare must continue in spite of losses. The Commander in Chief, Navy explains the submarine distribution for 15 April from the following points of view:

- a. enemy forces tied up.
- b. submarines in readiness in case of an invasion.

The Fuehrer agrees on every point.

5. The Walter Submarine:

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the plan to change to the Walter Submarine, and mentions the bottleneck encountered in tube manufacture. Special measures may have to be taken. As the result of the priority granted the Air Forces, types XXI and XXIII have been delayed, causing other armament to suffer. An example of this occurred in the Augsburg Division of the Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg. The engines were not completed because too few construction workers were employed to re-

pair bombing damages. And the ready submarine strakes could not be welded together because the engines were not ready.

The Fuehrer admits that this is a great disadvantage. However, from a broader point of view, the "Jaegerstab" will have to have this power. Otherwise industry might be destroyed still more, and thus submarine construction completely halted.

The Reichsmarschall agrees wholeheartedly.

6. Small Battle Weapons:

The Commander in Chief, Navy indicates which small battle weapons he has now definitely decided upon.

7. The Fuehrer and the Commander in Chief, Navy privately discussed the Crimea, Odessa and other matters.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Comdr. Pfeiffer

17 May 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conferences of the Commander in Chief,
Navy with the Fuehrer at the Berghof from 4 to 6 May
1944.

1. Protection of Prefabricating and Assembly Yards for New
Submarines.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, showing shipyard plans and the construction program, points out the completely inadequate protection of submarines under construction. The necessity of rapid construction of new submarines led to prefabrication of sections and their later assembly. This method, however, on one hand demands great concentration of parts of the same kind (in prefabrication) and on the other hand it crowds the submarines being assembled in the remaining shipyards. The prefabricated parts come from eight shipyards, each shipyard being assigned to the manufacture of one and the same section. They can only be assembled in three shipyards. Any transfer either of prefabrication or of assembly into the interior is impossible, since both must be near the water. All possible transfer of submarine construction has already been achieved through manufacture of strakes and all engine parts and accessories in the interior. Since thirty to forty parts of one kind are built simultaneously in one shipyard, a loss of thirty to forty submarines may be caused by a single air raid. The same condition exists in the assembly plants. In Hamburg for instance, thirteen submarines are assembled each month. Since it takes more than two months to complete assembly, more than thirty boats are always under construction on the building slips.

Only a small percentage of the construction of prefabricated parts is done under shelter. Assembly in Hamburg and Danzig is entirely unprotected. Shelters are being built for the assembly yards in Bremen which, however, are not to be ready before spring 1945. Excavations are being made in Hamburg for similar shelters. They will be completed at the earliest in 1946. No plans at all have been made for the security of the assembly yards in Danzig.

So far the Navy has had no raw material quotas for these shelters; they have been the responsibility of the Minister of Armament and War Production. Our own naval quotas for building materials are so very small that they do not even suffice to provide the necessary basic installations for present ship construction.

For this reason the Commander in Chief, Navy discussed this question thoroughly with Ministerialdirektor Dorsch, who has just been put in charge of construction on the home front. The latter believes that he can improve on the above-mentioned plan by having the shelters in Bremen ready in the fall of 1944 instead of in spring 1945. He also thinks he can provide protection for one dry-dock used for prefabrication. This is only a slight improvement. Most of the prefabricated parts and the boats being assembled would be as insecure as ever. The Commander in Chief,

Navy is convinced that the British will wait until construction of the new type submarine is quite advanced and then they will begin systematic bombings of all plants. We are in danger of seeing our new submarines destroyed before they have even been finished.

The Fuehrer recognizes the demand for protection as absolutely justified and says that it is completely out of the question that completion of the shelter be so long delayed; rather, more of them must be built. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that his means are absolutely exhausted and that only the Fuehrer can still help. The Fuehrer mentions the fact that he will discuss the question in the next few days with Dorsch and that he will direct him to build the shelters without fail. The Fuehrer thinks that additional dry docks should be covered and orders that the possibility be examined of covering the fourth entrance at Wilhelmshaven and of using it for manufacture of prefabricated parts.

The Commander in Chief, Navy also points out the weakness of anti-aircraft and smoke screen protection for Hamburg, Danzig and Bremen. For this reason he established personal contact with the local headquarters of the Air Force Administrative Command of Hamburg and Bremen on an inspection tour, and he now submits to the Fuehrer, in the presence of the Reichsmarschall and the Chief of the Air Force General Staff, the demands of the Air Force Administrative Command for an increase in air protection. The Reichsmarschall points out that complete security could not be attained by an increase in anti-aircraft and smoke screen protection. The Commander in Chief, Navy considers an immediate improvement nevertheless necessary since even with the greatest effort it would take too long to build concrete shelters; the danger in the coming months can be lessened only by anti-aircraft and smoke screen defense. Smoke screens are better than no protection at all; they reduce the accuracy of daytime carpet bombing.

The Fuehrer agrees that anti-aircraft and smoke screen protection should be increased. The Reichsmarschall receives corresponding directives.

2. Lack of Workers for Submarine Construction.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that submarine construction is continuously being cut down. According to the latest data only 140 submarines are to be completed in 1944 instead of 213, due to a lack of workers in steel construction. The Labor Exchange is not furnishing the promised labor; on the contrary, workers are being withdrawn. The Commander in Chief, Navy recommends that Speer should have authority over Sauckel.

The Fuehrer refuses. He will however under no condition agree to a decrease in submarine construction; Speer assumed the task and it is up to him to find a way to finish it. Speer had claimed that the total number of workers was sufficient. If his estimate was too low and he is having difficulties on this account, then it would be very clever of the Reich Ministry of

Armament and War Production to blame the submarine construction program of the Grand Admiral; they knew that the matter would be referred immediately to the Fuehrer, and they hoped to extort more workers from him in this way. He refuses however to fall for this kind of blackmail. Speer has to furnish the original number of workers for submarine construction under any circumstances.

3. Latest Operation in the North Sea Against a QP Convoy.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, using a map, explains that the submarines in the first patrol line, fighting in a stationary position, were close to the convoy and were able to sink several steamers and destroyers. In the days following, however, the farther the convoy proceeded to the South and the stronger enemy air defense became, the more the submarines were forced away from the convoy. This shows that whenever the submarines are close to a convoy, ships are sunk just as in the past. This operation proves again that submarines of the new type which proceed under water would have been able to change their position and stay with the convoy, making a continuous attack possible. The weakness of our own Air Force prevented us from attacking the airplane carriers in the convoy. The Commander in Chief, Navy raises the fundamental question whether it would not be more advantageous to use the torpedo bomber squadrons in the North Sea rather than in the Mediterranean. The Reichsmarschall explains that an attack on airplane carriers could not be made in broad daylight on account of our own weakness in the air. He agrees, however, that attacks on convoys are more important in the North Sea than in the Mediterranean.

The Fuehrer agrees with the statements of the Commander in Chief, Navy.

4. The Fuehrer, in a discussion of the situation in the Southeast, brings up again the question whether it is possible to increase the submarines in the Crete-Peloponnesos area of the Aegean Sea. The existence in Egypt of enemy divisions of combat strength is well established; the Fuehrer is very much afraid that this means the Anglo-Saxons might in the course of an invasion begin an operation against the Rhodes-Crete-Peloponnesos area. This region, especially the Peloponnesos, has no adequate defenses. The Fuehrer anticipates great success from submarines stationed in this region.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports as follows:

- a. The submarine force in the Mediterranean is weak.
- b. If the submarines were consolidated in the region Crete-Peloponnesos, these boats would no longer be available for the war in the Mediterranean and nothing would be sunk during the time of waiting.
- c. The British would notice the consolidation very soon and would concentrate all their means for defense in this area.

d. Submarine losses in ports from air attacks have seriously increased in recent weeks due to lack of shelters.

e. Submarines have constantly been sent to the Mediterranean but the new supply just covers the losses.

The Fuehrer appreciates these difficulties and misgivings but replies that he would again approach the Commander in Chief, Navy should the signs of danger increase in this region.

5. The mine situation in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, showing a mine map of these areas, announces that enemy warfare was intensified in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea in April. The Navy has been able to control this aggravated situation in recent weeks only with difficulty by utilizing all school flotillas for mine defense. Naturally as a result training in this important field has suffered greatly. Minesweeping forces will just be able to keep up their present strength until fall, or they will probably be more likely to decrease in numbers. No improvement can be expected before fall when the naval building program of 1943 will begin to show results. The Commander in Chief, Navy points out that this mine war threatens the submarine training regions, the supply service to Norway, and ore imports from Sweden in a very serious way.

The Fuehrer concurs with the statements of the Commander in Chief, Navy.

6. Use of new mines off the English coast.

The Commander in Chief, Navy announces his renewed intention to increase mine fields off the invasion ports along the southern coast of England with the most varied types of mines. He expresses his doubts concerning the use of pressure mines, since in the recent tests they failed to come up to expectations. Besides, there is the danger that the secret may be discovered, and if this should happen the enemy would have a great advantage in using this mine in the Baltic Sea.

The Fuehrer agrees and he directs the Reichsmarschall to take care that under no condition mines of this type fall into the hands of the enemy in case of an invasion through careless disposition of them along the coast.

7. Grossi.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that Captain Grossi had tried to smuggle 3,400,000 francs into Spain at a meeting on the international bridge in Irun with the Italian naval attache in Madrid. The Commander in Chief, Navy considers it advisable that the case should be investigated by Italy. He reports that he requested the Italian Minister for Naval Affairs to have Grossi transferred to Italy.

The Fuehrer says that such offenses by Italians are a matter of indifference to us. He does not consider an investigation worthwhile, because nothing would be gained by it. He wants Grossi to be sent back to Italy.

8. Lake Peipus.

During the discussion of the situation in the East, the Commander in Chief, Navy requests information from the Army as to whether the Russians are making any preparations on the East coast of Lake Peipus for using naval vessels. The Army and the Air Force report that nothing of the sort has been observed to date, and they promise to inform the Navy immediately should their reconnaissance reveal any such activity.

The Fuehrer requests brief reports concerning the strength of the naval forces, the distribution and type of vessels to be used for the intended operation of certain ports. In general the Fuehrer is satisfied.

9. T 27.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports during lunch he has with the Fuehrer alone his dissatisfaction with the behavior of the commanding officer of T 27 and announces that an investigation has been ordered. Other private discussions with the Fuehrer alone follow.

13 June 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy with the Fuehrer at Berghof Headquarters on 12
June 1944.

I. At 1300 the Commander in Chief, Navy participates in a conference on the situation with the Fuehrer.

1. It is mentioned that the enemy would gain a suitable debarkation point by seizing the harbor and the very well situated roadstead of St. Vaast. The possibility of mining it by air and naval forces should be investigated.

2. Concerning the emergency units of the Navy, it was briefly stated that 45,000 men have been made available for security duties. At present there is no necessity for any further transfers.

3. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the supply and delivery of DM 1 mines. It is impossible to lay mine fields in all potential landing areas. The Commander in Chief, Navy believes it best to lay first of all as many of these mines as possible in the Seine Bay area, especially off the mouths of the Vire (by air) and the Orne (by air and naval forces) and off Le Havre. Next in importance are Cherbourg, Dieppe, Boulogne and Ostende. The respective placement of incoming supplies of mines is to be decided as conditions warrant. The Commander in Chief, Navy considers it inadvisable to lay mines off the long coast of Jutland because the enemy can easily break through a long, narrow mine field by sacrificing a few mine exploding vessels, making gaps which render the rest of the mine field useless. Aside from that, Jutland is not as endangered as the areas of northern France, Belgium and Holland. (See Annex 1)

The Fuehrer agrees.

4. During the report on the Russian attack against the Finnish Front on the Karelian Isthmus the Fuehrer decides that the Army is to send several armament shipments to Finland at this time. "So long as the Finn fights, he will receive support; as soon as he begins to negotiate, the deliveries will be stopped." The Commander in Chief, Navy considers this a confirmation that it is correct to send them the promised PT boats on time, two at first.

5. Renewed minelaying off Sevastopol is discussed. The Fuehrer proposes that the Navy and the Air Force investigate the possibilities for such action.

6. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on supply shipments to Crete (see Annex 2). So far as tonnage is concerned, we can ship 6,000 tons per month at this time. However, the

Commander in Chief, Navy cannot guarantee this since the success of the shipments depends entirely on how much enemy interference is encountered and on the strength of our own fighter defenses. The Navy will do its utmost to comply with the demands as far as possible.

The Fuehrer states that the figure of fifty tons per day, as supplied by Lt. General Ereuer, cannot be considered a basis for procedure. There is no point in using combat submarines for supply shipments since their capacity is only thirty to forty tons.

The Commander in Chief, Navy announces that we cannot count on the first Italian transport submarine before about three months from now.

II. 1500.

The Commander in Chief, Navy has lunch with the Fuehrer. At this time they have a private conference.

III. 1630.

The Commander in Chief, Navy and Rear Admiral v. Puttkamer confer with Reichsleiter Bormann.

IV. 1730.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, Rear Admiral Voss and the Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff confer with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.

Keitel and Jodl consider the situation very serious, although they still see a chance for isolating the bridgehead with a little luck. Our best chance would lie in an unsuccessful enemy landing attempt at another point. It is doubtful whether the enemy will make such an attempt. The most likely spot for it would be the coast between Dieppe and Boulogne or between Calais and the Scheldt River. It is hoped that the long range bombardment of London, which will begin during the night from 12 to 13 June, will on the one hand divert enemy planes and on the other induce the enemy to attempt a second landing in northern France. (This last thought was already mentioned during the conference on the situation with the Fuehrer.) If the enemy succeeds in fighting his way out of the present bridgehead and gains freedom of action for mobile warfare in France, then all of France is lost. Our next line of defense would be the Maginot Line or the old Westwall. Field Marshal Keitel believes that even then there is still a chance to defend Germany. General Jodl does not commit himself in this respect since everything depends on how the situation develops and on how many troops we can save.

It was possible to transfer a small reinforcement from the Eastern Front. Air Force units from the Eastern Front are not suited for warfare in the West since they are too inexperienced to oppose the well trained personnel of the western Allies.

V. Conclusions of the Commander in Chief, Navy from II and IV.

1. It is still too early to abandon altogether the long range planning policy of the Navy in favor of short range action.

2. It is absolutely necessary to employ all naval forces in any way suitable in the Channel combat area. In this connection it must be investigated how many of the submarines in Group "Wallenstein" are suited for this purpose; forces must be assembled that are quickly ready for action at the expense of long-term projects.

3. The possibility of dissolving Group "Wallenstein" is to be considered in order to continue with training.

4. For the time being no further emergency units are to be formed in the West.

5. The submarines of Group "Landwirt" which are stationed in the Bay of Biscay are to be withdrawn. They risk serious losses in that area while being of no practical value because, to judge by the present situation, there is no likelihood of an enemy landing in the Bay of Biscay.

6. It must be kept in mind that it might become necessary to recall all submarines to Norway.

VI. Captain Assman reports as follows:

The Army is putting sixteen batteries of four 7.62 cm J.K.H. (Russian) guns, with 300 rounds of ammunition each, at the disposal of the Navy. Assman urges that they be claimed and put into action as soon as possible.

It will be possible to furnish fifteen more batteries of the same type.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Capt. Pfeiffer

11 June 1944

The Use of Mines with Magnetic Pressure Firing Devices.

The entire present supply of 600 mines with magnetic pressure firing devices is en route for use in the Western Area.

Six hundred more will be completed by 25 June. After that the monthly output will be 1,200 mines at the most. A bottleneck is caused by the lack of trained personnel essential to the manufacture. The present workers cannot possibly do more. An increase in production will be attempted, however, even at the expense of other types.

The mines with magnetic pressure firing devices can be employed only in an area between ten and twenty five meters deep. Thus not all the places most favorable from the military point of view, from which heavy ships can fire on the coastal batteries, can be mined. Tactically suitable would be a mine field which is bounded on the coast side by the range of our own batteries, and toward the sea by the range of the artillery of the attacking forces. On the accompanying maps (not included) the range of our own batteries is indicated by a green line. The areas hatched in yellow have the proper depth for mines with the magnetic pressure firing device.

Since only a comparatively small number of mines is being constructed, it would be impractical to distribute them evenly over the entire coastal areas. It is much more important to place them at focal points. The positions of the focal points will depend on the situation prevailing at a given time, and must be decided upon whenever a worthwhile number of mines is available. Under these circumstances precautionary mining of the west coast of Jutland would seem impossible.

Aside from the landing area, the following locations are to be considered as focal points for the mines:

1. Off the mouth of the Scheldt River
2. Off Hook of Holland
3. Off the middle of the Dutch west coast (Ijmuiden)
4. Off the Lister Deep
5. Off Esbjerg
6. Off Hanstholm

The distribution of the six hundred mines which are en route is intended as follows:

Ostende-----	90
Boulogne-----	70
Dieppe-----	120
Le Havre and Cherbourg -----	320

Shipping Conditions in the Aegean Sea.

See map for naval forces, shipping space, and shipping requirements and performance. (Map not included.)

Auxiliary sailing vessels have so far been used only to a small extent for supply shipments to Crete. The greater part was transported by steamers. After the loss of the steamer LUENEBURG, the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea gathered all available sea and air forces and attempted to ship the supplies for May in a large convoy to Candia. Suda still had supplies left from the April shipment.

This plan was unsuccessful. The enemy was obviously prepared through espionage and had patrolled the sea by air for days in advance. A concentrated attack was launched with a large number of modern bombers against which our defense is not strong enough. The only ship to get through was the TANAIIS (1,500 BRT), which was sunk by a submarine on its return trip after unloading. Total losses of our escort forces were two submarine chasers and the torpedo boat TA 16.

Experience shows that an attempt must be made to ship supplies less conspicuously in the future and to use auxiliary sailing vessels to a greater extent. Firm steps must be taken to make better use of Greek auxiliary sailing vessels by making them circulate faster.

Shipping capacity has been somewhat improved through transfer of the following additional vessels from the Black Sea up to 10 June: four cargo vessels (KT-Schiffe), nine coastal motor vessels, eight converted fishing craft, one tugboat, the steamer LOLA (1,193 BRT), and the small tanker DRESDEN (120 BRT).

There is enough shipping space to transport about 6,000 tons of supplies to Crete every month. The question of supplying a fighter escort is of especial importance in the event that enemy resistance increases.

The daily supply of 50 tons requested by the Fortress Commander of Crete can be provided without using transport submarines. The latter will be necessary only in case of an enemy offensive directed against the Aegean area, since it will then hardly be possible to send supplies with surface vessels.

However, the estimate of only 1,500 tons per month as given by the Fortress Commander, Crete contradicts the opinion of Group South and the demands of Army Group E. According to a statement from Army Group E the current needs will continue to be 6,000 tons a month, even higher temporarily for the purpose of accumulating a stock of supplies for six months.

The Naval Staff believes that the utmost effort must be devoted to supplying Crete as well as the entire Aegean area. The ship-

ment of 6,000 tons of supplies per month to Crete can be guaranteed only so far as shipping capacity is concerned, without considering enemy interference. If present conditions prevail, most of the supplies will get through.

We cannot guarantee to fulfill the requirements of the Aegean area because we cannot foretell the actions of the enemy.

12 July 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conferences of the Commander in Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters Berghof from 29 June to
1 July 1944.

Accompanied by Rear Admiral Wagner on special duty and
Lieutenant Commander Hansen-Nootbaar, aide.

1. 29 June 1944. 1300: The Commander in Chief, Navy partici-
pates in the Fuehrer Conference on the situation.

Nothing in particular came up concerning the Navy. After the conference the Commander in Chief, Navy had dinner with the Fuehrer.

2. 29 June 1944. 2000: Conference with the Fuehrer concerning
the situation in the invasion area.

After considerable time spent in private discussions in which only the Field Marshals von Rundstedt, Rommel, and Keitel and General Jodl participated, the Fuehrer summed up his conception of the war situation in the following terms:

The overpowering aerial superiority of the enemy and his very effective naval artillery limit the possibilities of a large-scale attack on our own part. We cannot fix the time of an attack; it is dependent on when troops and supplies can be brought up, and this cannot be calculated in advance. On the other hand we must not allow mobile warfare to develop, since the enemy surpasses us by far in mobility due to his air superiority and his superabundance of motor vehicles and fuel. Therefore everything depends on our confining him to his bridge-head by building up a front to block it off, and then on fighting a war of attrition to wear him down and force him back, using every method of guerrilla warfare. In attacking enemy supply lines our Air Force must concentrate on mines, torpedoes, and guided missiles (FK); the Navy on mines, torpedoes, and small battle units. Reference is made to the circling torpedo of the Air Force which compels the enemy to abandon the waters he has cleared of mines and forces him back into the mine fields. Fighters should be converted into fighter bombers, especially the jet-propelled fighters which can fly over and attack the combat area in short quick sorties in spite of the enemy's superiority in the air. For the safety of our own supply lines he proposes forming several strong anti-aircraft highways which are protected against strafing planes by a large number of anti-aircraft emplacements and are covered by fighter patrols. We will have to concentrate all possible trucks on our supply lines in the West even at the expense of other groups which need them.

The Reichsmarschall says:

Anti-aircraft artillery must be withdrawn from the airfields of

the Reich. The use of mines seems to bring good results. To judge from the latest aerial photographs, the enemy is shifting the center of his unloading activities from the mouths of the Vire and the Orne rivers, where mine fields have been laid up to now, to the area of Port en Bassin. This will be taken into account in our future mining operations. (Note: This shifting of enemy unloading activities has not been confirmed by other sources.)

In discussing our fighters, Field Marshal Sperrle states that the area of the 3rd Air Force is in need of an additional twelve to fourteen hundred fighters. This would enable us to operate five to six hundred fighters per day.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports:

The means of the Navy for operations in the Seine Bay are very limited. However, all suitable weapons possible will be used.

At present twelve PT boats are ready for action in the Channel area. A PT boat flotilla of eight boats (the 6th PT Boat Flotilla) is on its way there and will be followed by another one of six boats (the 10th PT Boat Flotilla) after its training period is up in about four weeks.

The last torpedo boat left in the English Channel will be withdrawn to the East about the middle of July after necessary repairs have been made, since a single torpedo boat can hardly operate successfully. The transfer of a torpedo boat flotilla is intended for later. To be sure, torpedo boats operate under greater difficulties in the Channel than PT boats.

All submarines with "Schnorchel", eight at present, are now operating in the Channel. They will be reinforced in July by fourteen boats, seven from Germany and seven from the West. Although great losses are anticipated, their use in this area is justified by the results.

We will continue to lay DM mines with PT boats. Since the output of these mines has increased to 1,200 per month, the supply has become adequate. The bottleneck at present is the lack of sufficient boats for minelaying.

Operations with small battle units ("Neger" midget submarines and remote controlled explosive motor boats) will soon be started. These weapons are subject to weather conditions and their practical value has yet to be established under actual war conditions.

In concluding, the Commander in Chief, Navy makes it clear that mine fields should be established in the Seine Bay as soon as possible, since they are the most effective means for eliminating the danger arising from the superior supply facilities of the enemy.

The Fuehrer:

We have got to lay more mines and still more mines in the Seine Bay with the tenacity of a bull dog, following the British procedure against our own transportation network. Just as they do, we must concentrate practically everything against the enemy supply lines; it is incomparably more effective to sink a whole cargo than to have to combat the unloaded personnel and materiel separately on land at a later date. Enemy warships must be attacked, too, especially the battleships. If the enemy should lose six to eight battleships in the Seine Bay, this would have the greatest strategic consequences. Just as we succeeded in Norway in forcing the enemy out of the country by harassing his supply lines with airplanes, submarines, and battleships, we must do the same thing here, too, by using every possible weapon available.

3. 30 June 1944. 1200:

Before the conference on the situation, the Commander in Chief, Navy has a discussion with Field Marshal Keitel concerning problems of motor transportation in the West. The Commander in Chief, Navy agrees to the consolidation of motor trucks of all branches of the Armed Forces after the new formulation of the directive has guaranteed sufficient respect for the needs of the Navy.

4. 30 June 1944. 1300: The Commander in Chief, Navy participates in the Fuehrer conference on the situation.

a. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that four naval coast artillery lighters were placed at the disposal of the Finns for use on Lake Ladoga. The question of transportation has been solved.

b. Following a report from Ambassador von Papen concerning renewed difficulties which the Turks are having with the British on account of the passage of German vessels through the straits, the Commander in Chief, Navy declares that no more ships will be sent through for the present until the question is finally settled with the Foreign Office.

5. 1 July 1944. 1300: The Commander in Chief, Navy participates in the Fuehrer conference on the situation.

a. The Commander in Chief, Navy announces his intention to send a strong submarine force into the North Atlantic in the near future in order to force the enemy to increase the protection of his convoys by withdrawing destroyers and airplanes from the Seine Bay, thus relieving the situation there. If this step is taken, the submarine reserve for defense against invasion in the Biscay Bay would be practically dissolved and the North Sea submarine group would be reduced by about ten boats.

The Commander in Chief, Navy believes that both consequences are supportable, since we hardly expect enemy action in the Bay of Biscay now, and we have observed no PQ convoys in the Arctic Sea for quite a while.

The Fuehrer agrees.

b. In connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer expresses the opinion that terror can only be fought with terror. A court-martial only creates martyrs. History proves that the whole world talks about those legally tried while no mention is made of the many thousands who lose their lives on similar occasions without a court-martial.

6. 1 July 1944. 1500:

Following the conference on the situation there is a special discussion with the Fuehrer concerning Army matters in which the Commander in Chief, Navy participates.

7. 1 July 1944. 1700:

The Commander in Chief, Navy is present at the state funeral for General Dietl at Castle Klessheim. After the ceremony he has a short conversation with the Foreign Minister.

a. The latter asks whether the Navy is in a position to send additional ships through the Bosphorus, since it might be desirable not to give in to the pressure exerted by the British on Turkey. Incidents such as that with the cargo ship (KT-Schiff) KASSEL must be avoided, however.

The Commander in Chief, Navy replies that passage of ships through the Bosphorus has been stopped for the time being in order not to aggravate the political situation in regard to Turkey through military measures; a resumption of this shipping is possible, though. He would, however, wait for the Foreign Office to take the necessary steps.

b. Speaking of Bulgaria, the Foreign Minister says he is not inclined to give in with regard to withdrawal of German naval vessels from Bulgarian ports. He is trying to steer the discussions into purely military channels, with the aim of bringing the Bulgarians to the point in the negotiations where they themselves will express the wish that the German naval vessels remain where they are. The Fuehrer has not yet approved this procedure, however.

The Commander in Chief, Navy states that so far Group South had received orders to reduce the number of naval forces in Bulgarian ports to a certain extent, and that further measures would not be taken if the Foreign Office should so desire.

8. 1 July 1944. Evening:

Return by plane to Koralle.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Capt. Pfeiffer

10 July 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters Wolfsschanze on 9 July
1944.

1. 1200:

A limited group conferred with the Fuehrer on the situation in the East. The following persons participated: from the Navy only the Commander in Chief, Navy; from the Eastern Front: Field Marshal Model, Lt. General Friesner and General v. Greim.

The conference topic is the problem of clearing up the serious situation on the central sector of the Eastern Front. In this connection a withdrawal of the Northern Army Group is out of the question. Experiences with the Fourth Army on the Central Front have shown that we cannot withdraw during the summer without incurring serious losses, because at this time the enemy is able to follow up on an extended front across the open country without depending on the highways. This way he can pass through gaps in the retreating armies and cut them off. Besides, a withdrawal of the Northern Army Group with all its equipment would require at least four weeks; the present crisis is too advanced for such a measure. A reinforcement of the penetration area by bringing up additional divisions before 17 July is considered to be the solution to the problem. The commanders of the Eastern Front believe that it will be possible to intercept the Russian thrust this way without having the Northern Army Group cut off.

On the Fuehrer's request the Commander in Chief, Navy points out what consequences a Russian break-through to the open Baltic Sea would entail. He refers to the importance of our control of the Baltic Sea; it is essential to Swedish iron ore imports which are of decisive importance for our war economy, and to the construction of the new submarine force. The most westerly position which still permits the closing of the Gulf of Finland is the position east of Reval, i.e., the Nashorn minefields. The possession of the Baltic islands is likewise important for this purpose.

However, should the enemy break through to the Baltic Sea further south, in Lithuania or East Prussia, then our position on the Gulf of Finland including the Baltic islands would be worthless. Enemy bases in the immediate vicinity, would threaten or even completely eliminate the ore shipments and the submarine training areas. The prime objective, therefore, to which everything else must be subordinated, even the possible withdrawal of the Northern Army Group, is the prevention of a Russian break-through to the Baltic Sea. Once the enemy has broken through, the threat to our flank from the Russian

air force based in Lithuania will make it impossible to supply the Northern Army Group and Finland by sea.

Concerning the employment of naval personnel for army purposes the Commander in Chief, Navy reports that the Navy has only three battalions which have had some training for land combat. These are the Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion 531, at Tytaersaari; the Naval Special Operations Unit, from the Narva Front, which is to participate in operation "Tanne Ost"; and the Naval Battalion "Hossfeld", formerly in the Crimea, the remaining troops of which are now stationed in Bulgaria.

Eighty per cent of the entire Navy personnel is directly employed in the defense of Europe. The remaining twenty per cent are needed until the end of 1944 for the fleet, for the present submarines, for newly commissioned submarines, and for combat and defense units. There is already a lack of personnel for other newly commissioned vessels. Therefore it will be impossible to give up any personnel so long as the Navy is expected to fulfill the duties it has had up to the present time. Aside from that, the Navy has absolutely no equipment for land-based combat troops.

Lt. General Friesner, Commander of the Northern Army Group states that he has enough men without equipment (Estonians) so that such troops are of no interest to him.

The Fuehrer decides that no Navy personnel will be transferred to land activities.

During the course of the conference Field Marshal Model reports that he is constantly conducting training courses for non-commissioned officers behind the front and has thereby achieved a continuous supply of fresh replacements at the front.

Wherever this is not done - and it does not seem to be the case in other places - the troops eventually become fatigued and fail when suddenly called upon.

2. 1400:

After the conference the Commander in Chief, Navy; the Reichsfuehrer SS; Field Marshals Keitel and Model; Generals v. Greim and Jodl, and Lt. General Friesner have lunch with the Fuehrer.

3. 1530:

Conference with the Fuehrer concerning other theaters of war.

a. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports on the qualities of the long range torpedo (Langstreckentorpedo), evolved from the G7e LUT, and the plans for its employment: it is to be fired by PT boats from the area near the Le Havre approach buoys into the landing area in the Orne estuary. The Commander in Chief, Navy emphasizes that the idea originates with an alert employee of the Torpedo Experimental Station.

The Fuehrer is very pleased and urges investigation whether this type of torpedo could also be used with a pilot.

b. In the discussion of the attack made by enemy pursuit planes on the one man torpedo (Neger) pilots returning from their mission during the night of 7 to 8 July, the Fuehrer raises the question whether one could not help these pilots by laying smoke screens from the air.

c. The Chief of the General Staff, Air reports that V-1's are to be launched from planes during the coming night of 9 to 10 July. This will serve to broaden the area from which they can be launched and will thereby scatter the enemy defenses.

d. He also reports that the first four jet propelled planes (Me 262) will be put into action against the beachhead within a week to ten days.

e. Subsequent to the conference on the air situation the Fuehrer makes approximately the following statement: The extreme importance of air superiority is apparent on all fronts. The Anglo-Saxons are particularly accustomed to advance only under protection of strong air cover. Everything depends therefore on our pursuit plane construction program. It must be kept top secret and we must accumulate ample reserves. Then the enemy will be very much surprised when in about four months the situation will begin to change in regard to air supremacy.

4. Field Marshal Keitel asks the Commander in Chief, Navy for naval support for protection of the hydrogenation plants. The continuous destruction of these plants constitutes the greatest handicap to our conduct of the war at this time. The last air raids cut gasoline production again from 2,200 cu.m. per day to 1,100 cu.m. per day. The Air Force has been ordered to double the smoke screen protection of the hydrogenation plants and also to improve their protection in other ways. However the Air Force does not have sufficient equipment at present. The Navy is therefore requested to assist in the emergency by providing the following:

a. The 12.8 cm anti-aircraft guns which are to be delivered to the Navy in the near future.

b. Smoke troops with equipment from Navy units.

Demands for their return after a stipulated period could be considered.

The Commander in Chief, Navy promises to investigate this request.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Capt. Pfeiffer

14 July 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters Berghof on 11 to 13 July
1944.

Participants: Rear Admiral Wagner, on Special Duty
Lt. Commander Hansen-Notbaar, Aide

1. 11 July 1944, 1300: Conference with the Fuehrer on the
Situation:

On the basis of this conference and several private conferences, the situation in the East appears as follows:

The situation at the Central and Northern Army Groups, which was so optimistically described by the Commanders of these two Army Groups on 9 July at Wolfsschanze, is not developing quite as expected. Even though the measures taken for the purpose of stabilizing the front in the area of the Central Army Group may still prove successful, the possibility that things may take a turn for the worse must also be considered. It is therefore necessary to make plans in advance in case there should be a successful Russian penetration into East Prussia. To prepare for such an eventuality a telegram (Annex 1) was sent by the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Chief, Naval Staff.

After the conference, the Commander in Chief, Navy lunched with the Fuehrer.

2. 11 July 1944, 1530:

The oakleaf cluster of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross is awarded to Captain Petersen, Commander of PT boats; Lt. Commander Hoffmann, Commander, 5th Torpedo Flotilla; and Lt. v. Mirbach, Commander, 9th PT Boat Flotilla.

3. 11 July 1944, 2000:

The officers newly decorated with the oakleaf cluster and Captain Assmann are guests of the Commander in Chief, Navy in Hintersee.

4. 12 July 1944, forenoon:

The Commander in Chief, Navy decided to have the personnel situation of the Navy investigated once more, in order to assist in relieving the critical over-all situation. Consequently the attached telegram (Annex 2), is sent.

5. 12 July 1944, 1300: Conference on the Situation with the
Fuehrer:

a. During the discussion of further enemy invasion possibilities, the Commander in Chief, Navy points out the necessity of air reconnaissance in the Thames area, so that enemy operation originating there may be discovered in time. The transfer of a large part of American troops from the area south of the Thames into the area between the Thames and the Humber suggests a possible enemy surprise attack from the Thames in the direction of Holland-Belgium, the German Bight, or even Jutland-Skagerrak. However, this transfer might be the result of V-1 bombardments.

b. The Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force is asked to secure aerial photographs of the port of Cherbourg as soon as possible, which will reveal to what extent the enemy can use the harbor for supply shipments.

c. The Fuehrer asks whether the Navy could spare 10,000 men to occupy part of the Narva position, so that one division may be released for combat on the front of the Central Army Group. It is a well fortified position, and all the soldiers would need is high morale in order to fulfill their mission there. They would be relieved by 1 September at the latest, because the last divisions that are to be brought up to strength will then be ready for action.

The Commander in Chief, Navy replies that he believes he can provide 10,000 good soldiers, but that the Navy is absolutely deficient in weapons and is particularly lacking in commanding officers and subordinate commanders who would be capable of handling this situation, which is not within the scope of the Navy. The Chief of Staff, Army, General Buhle, is charged with investigating the problem of armament. No final decision has been reached on this question for the time being.

6. 12 July 1944, 1500: Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with Field Marshal Keitel.

a. Motor vehicles for the Admiral, Small Battle Units.

The Commander in Chief, Navy asks that the motor vehicles needed by the Admiral, Small Battle Units be made available from the stocks of the Armed Forces High Command at appropriate times. In return, the Navy will forego claiming the equipment of the 2nd Naval Motor Transport Battalion from Army Group E. The Armed Forces High Command will be supplied with the exact list of the motor vehicles required with the dates they are needed.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command promises to deliver the required motor vehicles in time.

b. Concerning the question of personnel, the Commander in Chief, Navy again emphasizes that any naval personnel drafted for other types of duty will henceforth be at the direct expense of the submarine service. The only exception will be those troops already engaged in defense operations in the West.

c. The Commander in Chief, Navy requests the Armed Forces High Command to take steps to free the captured submarine com-

manders Luedden and Landfermann.

d. The Commander in Chief, Navy once more stresses the necessity for thorough air reconnaissance in the Thames area and the southern North Sea, so that enemy operations originating in that area may be discovered in time.

7. 12 July 1944, 2000:

The Commander in Chief, Navy is the guest of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

8. Because of an alarming teletype from the Commanding General, Northern Army Group, the Commander in Chief, Navy decides to postpone his departure and to take part in the conference on the situation with the Fuehrer on 13 July.

9. 13 July 1944, 1300: Conference on the Situation with the Fuehrer:

a. The situation in the East and questions of Army command are discussed by a very small selected group. The Commander in Chief, Navy is the only representative of the Navy.

During these discussions the Fuehrer decides that the 5,000 men to be furnished by the Navy for a blocking unit (Sperrverband) are not to be taken from men in training for submarine duty, but from those training units already now engaged in defense operations in the West.

b. Conference on the situation concerning the other theaters of war, including naval and air situation, a larger group participating.

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy again points out the possible danger to the Skagerrak. The main reason for this is the fact that the enemy, experienced on the sea, chooses coasts protected from the prevailing west wind for landings. This was also the case in the Seine Bay. The Fuehrer is more inclined to believe that further attacks will more likely be directed at the Holland-Belgium area or the Pas de Calais.

2. The Commander in Chief, Navy expresses the opinion that in the case of an evacuation of the Narva position by the Army, the island of Tytaersaari must be held under all conditions to the bitter end, since it is the key to all the mine fields in that region.

The Fuehrer agrees with this.

10. 13 July 1944, 1620:

Take-off from Salzburg for return flight to Koralle.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Capt. Pfeiffer

Annex 1

Copy

Telegram - Top Priority - Top Secret - For Commanding Officers only.

To: Chief, Naval Staff, Headquarters Koralle.

1. The situation did not entirely turn out as expected on Sunday. While the outcome may still be favorable, the contrary must also be reckoned with.
2. Therefore the necessary measures must be planned at once. To begin with, however, aside from certain members of the Naval Staff, only the Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and one member of the staff of each are to know of these plans. I believe a conference with the Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines in Koralle on 12 July would be advisable.
3. I shall probably return Thursday morning.

Commander in Chief, Navy

Telegram - Top Priority - Top Secret

To: Chief, Naval Staff
Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff
Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff
Chief, Bureau of Naval Administration
Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament
Commanding Admiral, Submarines
Chief, Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy requests immediate investigation of the personnel situation of the Navy from the following angles:

a. Have the commissioning dates been changed?

b. How much extra personnel will result from this until 1 January 1945?

c. An exact account of the distribution of the 74,000 men under the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and his personnel requirements up to 1 January 1945. These should be calculated on the basis of commissioning and decommissioning dates as now scheduled.

2. The Commander in Chief, Navy wants complete information concerning the Navy's supplies of hand and infantry arms and their distribution.

3. The purpose of this investigation is to make sure that no personnel is being hoarded over and above what is actually needed up to 1 January 1945. Instead, all personnel that can possibly be dispensed with is to be made available for other purposes of importance to the conduct of the war, if need be for such auxiliary work as the construction of fortifications and the like.

4. The findings on points 1 and 2 above are to be reported to the Commander in Chief, Navy at Headquarters Koralle on 13 July.

Rear Admiral Wagner

25 July 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy with the Fuehrer on 20 to 21 July 1944.

Present: Rear Admiral Wagner, on special duty
Lt. Commander Hansen-Nootbaar, Aide

Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy had originally intended to spend 20 and 21 July at Fuehrer Headquarters. When the Admiral at Fuehrer Headquarters called that the Duce was expected there on 20 July, the Commander in Chief, Navy decided to postpone his visit until 21 July and to confine it to this one day. On 20 July about 1315 an urgent call from the Admiral at Fuehrer Headquarters told the Commander in Chief, Navy to come to Fuehrer Headquarters at once. No reason was given. Consequently the Commander in Chief, Navy departed on 20 July about 1450.

1. 20 July 1944 about 1645:

The Commander in Chief, Navy was met at the airport in Rastenburg by Commander Meyer who was the first to inform him of the attempt on Hitler's life.

2. 20 July 1944, 1730:

After his arrival at Fuehrer Headquarters, the Commander in Chief, Navy was ordered to the Fuehrer who was in conference with the Duce.

3. 20 July 1944, 2000:

Release of a proclamation addressed to the Navy by the Commander in Chief, Navy (see Annex).

4. 20 July 1944, 2050:

The Commander in Chief, Navy instructs the Chief, Naval Staff by telephone to issue an order to all Naval commands at once containing the following points:

a. There has been a military conspiracy by a clique of generals (Fromm, Hoepner).

b. Reichsfuehrer SS has been made Commander of the Replacement Army.

c. The Navy is ordered to be in a state of readiness.

d. Orders issued by Army commands are not to be executed. Only orders of the Commander in Chief, Navy or of other ranking Naval officers are to be honored.

e. Demands of the Reichsfuehrer SS must be complied with by the Navy. Long live the Fuehrer.

Commander in Chief, Navy"

5. 20 July 1944, 2140:

The Admiral on Special Assignment called the Chief of Naval Staff concerning the arrest of Assistant Judge Advocate General, Count Stauffenberg, brother of the would-be assassin of the Fuehrer.

6. 20 July 1944, 2200:

The Commander in Chief, Navy is present at the evening conference on the war situation with the Fuehrer. Nothing of special interest to the Navy was discussed.

7. 20 July 1944, 2330:

Radio broadcast of the Fuehrer's speech to the German people and of the address by the Commander in Chief, Navy.

8. 21 July 1944, 1300: Conference on the situation with the Fuehrer.

The Commander in Chief, Navy reports to the Fuehrer on the results of submarine operations against the enemy invasion forces. Of twelve boats which were sent out, six were lost. The six boats which returned succeeded in sinking eleven destroyers and twelve transports. In addition it may be assumed that the six submarines which were lost also did some damage. Although these losses are severe, nevertheless the submarine operations are worthwhile.

9. Further conferences of the Commander in Chief, Navy:

a. Conference with Field Marshal Keitel concerning the trucks for the Admiral, Small Battle Units. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command promises to make the requested number available. He also gave the necessary orders in regard to the radio trucks, which, however, are still causing some problems.

b. Conference with General Jodl and General Warlimont for the purpose of discussing whether coastal batteries should be placed further inland for purposes of camouflage. Both are convinced that greater care than heretofore must be taken to camouflage the batteries on the seaward side. They agree, however, that the seaward effectiveness of the batteries must remain the prime consideration.

Thereupon the Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the Naval commands concerned should receive instructions supplementary to the directive from the Armed Forces High Command, to the effect that the ordered camouflage measures must not be permitted to affect to any appreciable extent the direct fire or the seaward range of the batteries.

10. 21 July 1944, 1415:

The Commander in Chief, Navy instructs the Chief, Naval Staff by phone to rescind the state of readiness order.

11. Commander in Chief, Navy appoints the Admiral on Special Assignment to substitute for the Admiral at Fuehrer Headquarters. He is also to take over reporting to the Fuehrer on the naval war situation.

12. 22 July 1944, 1630:

After visiting the wounded officers at the hospital at Rastenburg, the Commander in Chief, Navy flies back to Berlin.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Capt. Pfeiffer

Men of the Navy:

The treacherous attempt to assassinate the Fuehrer fills each and every one of us with holy wrath and bitter rage towards our criminal enemies and their hirelings.

Divine Providence spared the German people and its Armed Forces this inconceivable misfortune. In the miraculous escape of our Fuehrer we see additional proof of the righteousness of our cause.

Let us now more than ever rally around our Fuehrer and fight with all our strength until victory is ours.

Grand Admiral Doenitz

16 October 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conferences of the Commander in Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters Wolfsschanze from 13 to
14 October 1944

Participants: Rear Admiral Wagner, on special duty
Lieutenant Luedde-Neurath, aide

1. 13 October 1944

1100 Conference with Minister Speer.

1200 Report by Rear Admiral Moessel.

1210 Report by Captain von Conrady on the situation in the East. He tells about the plans of the Northern Army Group and the proposals by the Chief of the General Staff, Army concerning probable higher transport requirements, in reference to the telegram received by the Naval Staff. A copy of the answer from the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch on 14 October is given to Major von Freytag-Loringhoven.

2. 1500 Conference on the situation within a very small circle with the Fuehrer. Only the Commander in Chief, Navy represents the Navy. This was followed by a private conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer. The following questions were discussed:

a. Command of the Armed Forces on the coast and in the coastal fortifications on the lower levels. Naval officers are better qualified for such work than army officers. Therefore the present arrangement in the coastal areas at home remains the best solution; that is, naval commands under the Commander of the Replacement Army.

The Fuehrer confirms this opinion.

The Commander in Chief, Navy shows the Fuehrer the reports of the admirals in the West (see letter of 29 September 1944 and Annexes 1 and 2, 1 Skl. Ib 30945/44 Gkdos).

b. The importance of Antwerp to the enemy. The Commander in Chief, Navy produces a map of the Scheldt River showing the mine fields laid by the Navy which are expected to delay the enemy for about three weeks.

The Fuehrer remarks that even two weeks would help. He grants the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Navy that the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross be given to Commander Czyskowitz, commander of the harbor of Antwerp. After the headlong

evacuation of the city by the Army he was killed while carrying out demolition work according to orders.

A map of the flooded areas at Walcheren is shown.

c. The situation in the eastern Baltic. This is an important training ground for the Navy, and it is necessary to do everything possible to combat enemy attacks from sea and air. Fighter planes have been requested from the Commander in Chief, Air.

d. Progress in the construction of the new submarine models. The Commander in Chief, Navy hopes to put the first vessels of model XXIII into action in January 1945, and about forty submarines of model XXI in February.

e. The greatest danger to the new submarines lies in the air raids on the harbors according to the Commander in Chief, Navy. Therefore extensive construction of submarine pens in the home ports is absolutely necessary. Aside from those already completed and those under construction, 196 more pens are planned. Minister Speer urges that as soon as the building facilities, being used at present to provide shelters for fighter plane construction, are freed in the course of next spring, they should be released for making submarine pens.

The Fuehrer is in full agreement with this proposal.

f. "Seehund" midget submarines with a larger range will probably be put into action off the east coast of England starting in December. A map with the distribution of small battle units is shown.

g. The morale of the naval troops is satisfactory.

h. Captain Werner Hartmann is assigned as leader of home defense (Volkswehr) in Danzig, West Prussia, on the request of Gauleiter Forster.

i. The oil problem. The supplies of fuel oil are satisfactory. The Diesel oil situation is very strained and the shortage is already affecting operations.

j. A chart showing shipments in connection with pre-fabrication of submarines is presented. (Not included.)

3. 1830 The Commander in Chief, Navy has a conference with General Jodl about questions of command of Armed Forces on the coast and in coastal fortifications. The Commander in Chief, Navy gives the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff a copy of the same papers which he had earlier given the Fuehrer (cf. 2a). He asks that the interpretation of the Fuehrer's directive No. 40 as recommended by the Naval Staff be issued as an order of the Armed Forces High Command (Cf. Adm. Qu II Mob a 4003/44 Gkdos of 5 September 1944).

4. 2000 Supper in the "Haus der Marine" with Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, Major General (SS) Fegelein, Staatsrat Johst, and Lt. Colonel (SS) Grotjmann as guests of the Commander in Chief, Navy. Minister Speer joined them afterwards.

5. 14 October 1944

1215 Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with Field Marshal Keitel.

a. Command of the Armed Forces on the coast (see 3) is discussed.

b. The Armed Forces High Command requisitioned 300 Navy trucks for the Army which were in repair or being reconverted for use as gas generators. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command promises that these trucks will be returned.

c. Lt. General Ziegler's memorandum about combining the supply and administrative services of the three branches of the Armed Forces is mentioned. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command declares that this question is unimportant and out of date, since the Reichsfuehrer SS has been instructed to regulate these departments in the Army, and since the Reichsfuehrer SS as well as the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commander in Chief, Air do not agree with Ziegler's suggestions. Ziegler's suggestions are to be submitted.

d. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command confirms the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Navy that the port of Memel is not to be destroyed if it is lost, whereas the Kurland harbors should be demolished in such an event.

6. 1415 Among other things, the Commander in Chief, Navy discusses problems of command within the Air Force with the Reichsmarschall.

7. 1500 Conference on the situation with the Fuehrer attended by a very small group. The Commander in Chief, Navy emphasizes the necessity of holding the peninsula of Svorbe as long as there is a possibility that we might have to withdraw the northern Army Group by sea. The Commander in Chief, Navy indicates the necessity of substantially reinforcing the fighter units on the polar coast in support of operation "Nordlicht".

8. 1715 The Commander in Chief, Navy has tea with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

9. 2020 Return trip on special train of the Armed Forces High Command.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Pfeiffer

Berlin 29 September 1944

Commander in Chief of the Navy

I. 1. So far I was convinced that it was correct to give the Army commanders over-all command authority (Wehrmachtsbefugnisse) as was ordered. While I approved in general, I thought it was particularly advisable in matters of coastal defense. This opinion was founded on the basic assumption that the Navy's task is on the sea, and that it should not burden itself with problems of land warfare, of which it knows nothing and for which it has no training with the exception of coastal defense.

2. Recent events, especially the experiences of the retreat from France, have made me change my mind.

Taken separately, these happenings may not be too important or of too great consequence. Taken all together, however, they prove that many of the Army commanders given over-all command authority were not able to use it for the best interest of the combined Armed Forces or to the best advantage of the war.

3. I believe that the reason for this lies in the fact that many of the Army officers lack the necessary knowledge and experience, and consequently have neither the perspective nor the self-assurance essential for the solution of the problem as a whole.

4. I believe, therefore, that in the future the defense of large harbors and mouths of rivers should be assigned to naval officers designated as fortification commanders or combat commanders, since they have the experience and the correct judgement for warfare in such areas. Officers of the General Staff should be attached to the staff of the naval officers, to advise and assist them in matters of land defense.

for motivation, cf. Annex 1.
for documentary proof, cf. Annex 2.

(the following three paragraphs, II-IV incl. are added in handwriting. Tr.N.)

II. The above letter did not go out. The Commander in Chief, Navy decided to give Annexes 1 and 2 personally to the Fuehrer, to the Chief, Armed Forces High Command, to the Chief of Operations Staff, Armed Forces, and to the Reichsfuehrer SS. He did so at Headquarters Wolfsschanze (see Minutes of the Conference, 13 to 14 October). On 23 October he also informed the commander of Naval Group West. The fifth copy was given to the Admiral on Special Duty.

III. The attached four paragraphs are to be destroyed.

IV. Send on to Deputy Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff.

Initialed

Chief of Operations Staff, Naval
Staff and
Deputy Chief of Operations Branch
Pf., 23 October 1944

(the following four paragraphs are in a different handwriting.
Tr.N.)

1. The use of the collective terms "Army" and "Navy" gives rise to generalizations which are not true and do not do justice to the situation. An incompetent company commander is not "the Army"; a decrepit reserve officer in command of anti-aircraft artillery is not "the Air Force".

2. The attitudes and actions of a beaten army cannot serve as basis for general conclusions.

3. Basically it is correct and necessary that naval units maintain their independence and that our Navy personnel at the front should be encouraged to stand up to the Army. The Army's encroachments can be explained by the fact that powers are summarily used (so-called over-all command authority), and by the good nature of the naval units. This situation can be changed.

4. The material is not suitable for written presentation.

The Army does not fully comprehend the nature of coastal defense. The infantry soldier trained on land does not take to the principle: "The beach is the main line of resistance; the enemy must be beaten on the water." He dislikes to have the water in front of his positions and wants to get away from the coast. His endeavor to draw the fighting onto the land is noticeable again and again.

The above subject became a topic for discussion also in the higher staffs in France. During map maneuvers the suggestion was made to allow the enemy to proceed inland and then to beat him in the open field. Although the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West repeatedly gave orders for the correct type of warfare, it was Field Marshal Rommel who finally strove to put it into effect.

The Army's instinctive dislike for the water has often led to friction in the lower commands.

The coastal batteries were not recognized as the mainstay of coastal defense, and consequently too little concrete was allotted for their reinforcement. The Army's system of strong points along the coast was not built up with coastal artillery as the backbone. Very often the coastal batteries stood alone, without lateral contact with the infantry defenses.

Instead of protecting the valuable batteries with concrete fortifications, large structures were put up for machine gun installations and troop shelters.

The Army endeavored to withdraw its coastal artillery batteries from the beach and to assign them to the regular Army artillery, or to use them so that they could function as division artillery.

This endeavor persisted even after the invasion, justified by the unsubstantiated argument that the forward batteries were eliminated by ship's artillery.

During combat, the Army commanders often looked upon the coastal artillery units primarily as soldiers who can be used as infantry. They did not recognize the decisive value of the coastal batteries for the defense operation as a whole.

Since the Army in many instances has no understanding for the work of the Navy, many are apt to consider that the personnel employed by the Navy could be put to much better use elsewhere, and that it is wrongfully being withheld from the Army. This explains the endeavor to make the naval units as much as possible subject to Army command, so as to be able to use them as infantry or supply units.

The Army is using its leadership in land warfare and the over-all command authority assigned to it as a pretext for doing so.

Although the higher Army commands in France have the right attitude concerning naval affairs, faulty decisions were the rule in the intermediate commands which had been given over-all command authority by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.

A. Extract from the report of the Commanding Admiral, Group West:

1. On the first day of the invasion, the town commandant of Bayeux is said to have ordered the "Longues" battery and the engineer unit assigned to it to withdraw to Bayeux. The battery commander disregarded this order and attempted in vain to call back the retreating engineer unit which was to have given him infantry protection. The engineer unit saw no soldiers on the way back to Bayeux, which implies that Army personnel had been withdrawn earlier, although the enemy was not yet in the area.

The commanding officer of radar station La Percee, a major, ordered his troops back to Isigny for infantry defense. They had to abandon the station intact, partly with built-in weapons. Parts of the garrison returned to La Percee the next day and deduced from tank tracks that a small enemy force had been at the station for a short time since their departure. Otherwise there was still no enemy in the area on the second day.

On the day of the invasion, the crews of three floating artillery batteries in Port-en-Bessin were told to leave their boats, which were no longer seaworthy but the guns of which were still intact, and were to be absorbed into the land defenses. Through the intervention of the flotilla commander who arrived at that moment, the guns on the boats were manned again. An enemy landing in this spot was thus fought off for the time being.

The modern naval rapid fire batteries "Blankenese" and "Bastion-Cherbourg", were blown up by order of the divisional command without being attacked either by sea or by land. This was done so the gun crews could be used as infantry in land combat.

Before the enemy ever approached Cherbourg, the fortress commander there already assigned the harbor defense troops to land combat, ordered the harbor defense vessels to be laid up and their guns and crews used on land. Heavy infantry weapons were transferred from the sea to the land front. They would greatly have helped the port commander in the final battle.

2. Extract from the brief report about the happenings in Brittany:

On 3 August the Naval Shore Commander, Brittany reported that the 343rd Infantry Division was thinking of evacuating the entire coast of northern Brittany. There is no report to that effect from XXV Army Corps.

The morning of 4 August, reports were received that the Army was preparing to withdraw from the coast of northern Brittany. The Naval Shore Commander asked whether the Navy also was to retreat, destroying harbors, light houses and radar equipment. It was decided that the Navy should stay at its post, since it seemed impossible that the Army would make such extensive evacuations without previously notifying the Navy. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West was notified.

In the course of the morning, the Naval Shore Commander repeatedly reported that the Army was abandoning harbors and bases, and asked for instructions, since the Army had not issued any. The Naval Shore Commander was ordered to work in cooperation with the XXV Army Corps, whereupon he ordered the Navy to join the Army in the retreat and to destroy equipment, etc.

The Port Commander of St. Briec was the first to report the retreat of the Army. Group West intervened and demanded that the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West order the naval bases of Lezardrieux, Benodet, Concarneau and La Trinite held. The same demand was radioed to XXV Army Corps stationed in Lorient. No further measures could be taken by Group West at the moment, since there was no information on the enemy's situation and there was still hope that this was only a partial evacuation. Group West was reassured in this respect when the Naval Shore Commander replied that the battery in Paimpol would not be destroyed. From this it was inferred that the harbor and the radar equipment of Paimpol and Lezardrieux would not be given up either.

About 1800 the Naval Shore Commander reported that the order was given to blow up the Paimpol battery. Due to the efforts of Group West, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West gave orders that battery Paimpol should not be destroyed. He empowered the Naval Shore Commander and the Commanding Admiral to disregard any orders of the XXV Army Corps incompatible with the interests of naval warfare.

At the same time an order was received from the Fuehrer that none of the bases constructed as fortifications should be destroyed, but that all were to be defended. However, the Paimpol battery was blown up on the evening of 4 August, before this order came through. The Army continued evacuation operations. In the process, a large part of the radar equipment outside of the fortifications and harbors of Paimpol, Lezardrieux and Morlaix was destroyed. After receiving the report that the Army was evacuating Benodet, Group West took action, so that the base of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West was left intact, with light Navy anti-aircraft artillery for its protection.

On 5 August the infantry returned to Benodet, although the base and the radar equipment had previously been blown up. There was no information as to the whereabouts of the naval garrisons of the abandoned bases.

On the morning of 4 August the spearheads of the enemy in southern Brittany reached Chateaubriant. There was little danger of a Loire crossing at that moment, since there were sufficient Army forces north of the Loire at Nantes and Angers. The clothing depot of Ancenis and the submarine supply center in Redon were being evacuated. About half the material in Redon had to be destroyed, since the Army was blowing up the bridges leading to the town. On 5 August the Army withdrew from the coast of Quiberon Bay, including La Trinite. The Navy also retreated from there and destroyed all sea marks. Neither Group West nor the Naval Shore Commander was able to interfere, since no one had been notified beforehand. The main objection in this case is the fact that the Army acted without previously contacting and notify-

ing the Commanding Admiral and the Naval Shore Commander, in spite of the fact that the Commanding General of the XXV Army Corps specifically had over-all command authority. The demolition of the Palmpol battery is especially incomprehensible since it was of the utmost importance not only for naval warfare but, having 360° traverse guns, also for land warfare. Being a coastal battery, it should definitely not have been blown up without the consent of the Navy, which was in tactical command there. Presumably the orders of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West and of the Fuehrer were not carried out because Army radio communications broke down. Therefore the XXV Army Corps had no way of stopping the retreat once it was ordered.

3. La Pallice on the Atlantic coast was declared a fortress. The fortifications of North Gironde, South Gironde and La Pallice were ordered reinforced with men and guns of the naval artillery and crews from naval vessels. In this way large numbers of naval personnel remained in the fortifications.

The remaining personnel was to join the Army and begin the march via Bourges in the direction of Belfort-Strasbourg. The naval units were badly prepared for this march through territory occupied by hordes of terrorists. Not only did they have no vehicles, but they also lacked all marching equipment and sufficient armament. For this reason the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West ordered that the naval units should be given all possible aid and supplies. So far, this order is not known to have been carried out by the Army. When the situation became precarious during the crossing of the Loire, the naval units were ordered to cover the retreat of the Army, and to remain there while the Army troops retreated. Reports continually reached Group Command West that the Army, instead of aiding the Navy, applied its over-all command authority in land warfare in order to seize the few trucks the Navy still had left after the Army's earlier requisition. A large part of the naval personnel therefore set out for home from the Atlantic coast area on foot, on bicycles or in horse-drawn carts.

It must also be mentioned that the supplies the Army left for the beleaguered fortresses were far from satisfactory. The Commanders of all these fortresses were unanimous in their complaints that the supply of armor piercing ammunition and short range anti-tank weapons, partly also of small arms, was insufficient. Further supplies were provided only to a limited extent.

The destruction of Bordeaux harbor was only partially carried out, and then stopped on Army orders. Details of these circumstances could not be ascertained as yet. But this is not the only instance of interference by the Army. In other places also, for example in Bayonne, in matters pertaining to the demolition of the harbor, which was assigned to the Navy, the Army cut in, issuing orders that either went too far or not far enough. In particular, the Army centered its demolition activities on tiny unimportant fishing harbors which the Navy had no orders to destroy. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the Army, which was so eager to interfere in the harbor demolition work assigned to the Navy, did not make nearly as thorough preparations as the

Navy when it came to the destruction of objects which are the Army's responsibility, i.e. roads, bridges, tunnels and dumps.

During the entire retreat the relationship between the Navy and the lower Army offices presented a difficult problem. The overall command authority given to the Army in matters pertaining to land warfare was poorly handled by the lower commands. Out of lack of understanding and often unfriendliness, they went further than the orders issued intended. While Army, and above all, Air Force motor vehicles were allowed to function more or less undisturbed, requisition of naval motor vehicles, seizure of fuel, and assignment of naval personnel to unforeseen tasks were the order of the day. The orders issued by the responsible Army command in full cooperation with Group West either did not get through to the lower units, or in many instances were not carried out. Especially shocking was the treatment of the ship skeleton crews and the naval emergency units used for the protection of railroads between Paris and the German border under the command of the respective area commanders. In many cases the area commanders left their posts without taking along the naval units under their command or even notifying them. These units therefore remained at their posts, without sufficient armament and training, true to the order not to retreat unless ordered to do so, and were annihilated by enemy tanks. In other instances the ship skeleton crews were assigned to patrol and combat duty, without having either the training, arms or leadership necessary. Because of these handicaps they were of little use in battle, while the losses were high. Whole units disappeared without any trace. Without bothering to live up to its obligation to look after the needs of the naval personnel, the Army almost always was glad to use the naval units to cover its own retreat. It is readily understandable that these experiences aroused bitter animosity in the Navy in many places.

B. Extract from the report of the Commander of Submarines, West.

Meanwhile the situation in Brittany developed rapidly, since the troops stationed outside were hurriedly withdrawn to the fortifications before advanced enemy reconnaissance patrols and terrorists. This caused difficulties especially in Lorient, where it greatly interfered with the work in the shipyards. It jeopardized the scheduled submarine construction program as well as the installation of the Schnorchel device.

The commanders of two submarines which left Lorient on 7 August gave me the following account of conditions in Lorient. They received their information from the flotilla commander in Lorient.

The Army units entered the town in a considerable hurry and put their supplies into the submarine pens. This greatly disrupted the work in the shipyards. At the same time an order came from the fortress commander (since the entrance of the Army this was Lt. General Fahrenbacher), that the shipyard workers were to be used in the fortifications. Only the strong remonstrances of the shipyard commander and the senior flotilla commander, together with the order meanwhile issued by the High Command demanding that

the work in the shipyards, including the installation of Schnorchels, be carried on even in the event of a battle, made it possible gradually to resume the work. The troops were again taken out of the city and eventually put to more active duty. To accomplish this, it was necessary to call attention to the Fuehrer's order concerning the holding of fortresses. The former fortress commander, Colonel Kaufmann, told the flotilla commander that this was the most humiliating day in his entire career. The fortress commander ordered sorties into the surrounding territory only at the insistence of the flotillas and the other naval units, which made some of their own men available for the purpose. Such sorties still were fully feasible at that time.

Conditions in St. Nazaire were similar to those in Lorient, although the enemy was not yet as close to the fortress. Here also greater activity was effected only by furnishing naval personnel.

Unfortunately many supplies and stocks of ammunition were destroyed unnecessarily. Sorties could have been made for some time to come to the supply depot in Redon, which was destroyed because the bridges leading there had been blown up prematurely. Similar things happened elsewhere.

Things quieted down when the enemy did not press any further, and the shipyards were able to continue their work undisturbed.

The situation in La Rochelle was of special interest, since this strong point was presumably to be held the longest. The place is well fortified, and above all the outer defense line, in contrast to other fortresses, is 8 km out. On the seaward side the city is well protected by the islands of Re and Oleron. The latter are, however, vulnerable to landings from the air because the forces stationed there are inadequate. Therefore the danger existed all along that the islands might fall in the hands of the enemy, and the harbor would thus be blocked.

In the beginning the fortress was fairly well supplied with arms, but had very little ammunition. Above all, almost no anti-tank weapons were left after the greater part of the stock, which had been limited to begin with, was transported to the northern fortresses. The fortress commander in charge at the time told me that he had ordered ammunition and anti-tank weapons for months, but that he had not received anything. Worse yet, supplies were continually removed from the fortress.

The fortress commander himself gave us cause for considerable concern. Colonel Freusser, 62 years old, decorated with the "Pour le Merite", had proven himself most commendably in the construction of the fortifications. But lately he had broken down under the strain of the situation, was continually ill, and did not have the energy to take far-reaching measures. He did not, however, appoint a substitute, but tried to keep control of everything himself. The result was that important decisions were delayed for days and urgent measures could not be carried out. The situation finally became so bad that the commander of the shipyards and I proposed a substitute. The new

fortress commander, Vice Admiral Schirlitz, finally made every effort to have all possible weapons, ammunition and provisions brought into the fortress from the surrounding towns before these were evacuated by the retreating troops and the supplies destroyed in the process. Likewise, intensive work was begun at last to install ship guns on land. These measures greatly improved the defensive strength of the fortress. Only anti-tank weapons were still lacking as before, since no supplies were sent in spite of all requests.

The reason for many of these delays and for other difficulties is to be found above all in the defective communications system of the Army. As soon as their wire communications broke down, all communication ceased unless it was possible for the Naval Communication Service to step in.

C. Extract from the report of the Naval Shore Commander, Languedoc.

Cooperation with the corps commanders was excellent before the invasion as well as during the retreat. However, their conception of the enemy situation in the Mediterranean area differed from that of the Navy. It appeared at times that the divisions did not even analyze the situation. They merely waited for orders from above or claimed to be following orders supposedly issued by the Fuehrer. The divisional commanders were continually asking the Naval Shore Commander questions which confirmed the impression that they had absolutely no conception of either the enemy's situation or their own, and that therefore they were not getting any information from above. As it was, the Naval Shore Commander had such exact information about the situation of the enemy that he could foretell the approximate time and area, and almost the exact day and place of the landing in southern France.

The Army issued the retreat order for the troops in the southern area in such a way that it was obvious from the beginning that it could not be carried out. When attention was called to this fact, it was acknowledged, but the objection was dismissed with the remark: "Orders from above". Thus, for example, the naval units were supposed to cover the distance from the Spanish coast to the assembly area on a level with Montpellier, i.e. 200 km, in 24 hours on foot.

Although the Naval Shore Commander was informed by Naval Group, West by radiogram as early as 17 August that a withdrawal was planned, he did not receive instructions from the Army until 19 August. Directives then came in so fast that they could hardly be executed. The harbors, batteries, etc. had to be blown up at night in a few hours. The naval units from Port Vendres were not able to join the Army, since the column to which they were assigned had already left. Absolutely all vehicles, horses and bicycles had been requisitioned by the Army days before, so that the Navy was forced to go on foot. The means of transportation were not equally distributed among the units. On the contrary, the Army commanders even seized some of the Navy's motor vehicles. Only the intervention of the Naval Shore Commander put a stop to further seizure of vehicles.

Hurried and confused as the retreat was, the leadership of some of the lower commands was downright stupid. The naval units from Port Vendres were simply left to their fate. In Perpignan, Narbonne and Agde the German shelters, anti-tank obstacles and supposedly even German arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the terrorists intact. The general in charge of the western column reported that the naval troops could not possibly get through, because the towns were occupied by terrorists. But in spite of this, some of the naval units later were able to catch up with the Army. The entire naval unit from Port Vendres is said to have been annihilated or captured south of Montpellier. In my opinion the only reason why this unit was unable to reach the Army is the fact that bridges were destroyed prematurely. The request of the Naval Shore Commander to delay the departure and the demolition was rejected with the answer: "Orders from above". Actually, on the basis of the preparations made, 20 to 24 batteries could have been made mobile; they would have been of great value to the Army in later combat.

With the exception of the naval unit of Port Vendres, the naval units began the retreat according to plan, divided among the three Army columns. Eventually they were able to requisition vehicles for their supplies and thus to cover the required distance. During the entire retreat, the naval troops looked out for themselves without any help.

On 2 September the naval units were put under Navy command at the request of the Naval Shore Commander. They were led to the German border in close formation, more than 3,000 men strong. Since railroad transportation was not available for some time, the men continued on foot to the training center at Muensingen. During this march they covered as much as from 60 to 80 km a day. The behaviour, discipline and morale of the troops were excellent, and were often praised by the Army commanders. A large number of scattered and small units without leadership joined the naval troops. It was sad to see such troops, who were trying to attach themselves to some leadership because they were without officers. This was especially true of the Air Force, particularly the Anti-aircraft Artillery. On the whole the behavior of the troops depended entirely on leadership. Wherever it was missing, unbelievable conditions prevailed, for instance, roads became completely blocked. Generally speaking it was possible to relieve such congestion by determined action. Whenever the commanding general heard of such a situation, he intervened personally. Furthermore, air and terrorist attacks resulted in wild confusion. Terrorist attacks, however, were stopped the moment the troops were ordered to counterattack. Wherever there was leadership, all danger from terrorists immediately vanished, since these were usually a cowardly lot and attacked only from ambush. Unfortunately the scattered units often reported that their officers had abandoned them. Some of the members of an anti-aircraft artillery unit said literally that "their officer was the first to beat it". Some officers, who had completely gone to pieces, supposedly drove alongside the troops and advised them: "Every man for himself". At times it seemed that the units marching

along the roads consisted only of Air Force personnel, to be sure without leadership, composed only of the youngest recruits, and moving in endless motorized columns. This extended all the way into German territory.

D. Extract from a letter of the Fortress Commander, Dunkirk, Rear Admiral Frisius.

I have the general impression that a certain lethargy and irresolution prevails among the troops. It remains to be seen whether more determined leadership can change this. However, we must not forget that meanwhile many of the places which in my opinion were suitable for defense, have been abandoned. This has made the area smaller and allows for more concentrated enemy action.

I would like to stress that the preparations made to defend the town toward the rear are even worse in Calais than in Boulogne. Already at that time the Army wasted its concrete, armor and the like on spots in the harbor which I termed utterly stupid. Here we can truly say: It was a fatal mistake to give the Army overall command authority for the defense of harbors. The Army has done nothing but interfere in the affairs of the Navy, thereby endangering the Navy's interests and making its tasks more difficult. As for the Army's own contribution to the defense, we now clearly see that it is an absolute zero. This is readily explainable by the many changes in personnel, in which, of course, every new man disapproved of the measures taken by his predecessor. By the time he himself had worked out new plans, he was transferred elsewhere, and his successor again declared that everything he had done was stupid. The fortification engineering staffs which, as such, were permanent, were the world's worst bureaucrats. This is shown most clearly by the fact that construction plans usually had to be handed in within 48 hours, but that then correspondence was carried on about them for some three to four weeks and sometimes three months before the work was begun. It was always the same story, and now we are reaping the consequences.

E. Extract from the report of the Commanding Admiral, Netherlands.

The suddenly tightening situation on 3 and 4 September, coupled with a complete absence of information about conditions on the land front, resulted in a crisis in southern and central Holland in the beginning of September. It brought with it many unpleasant occurrences. Rumors were rampant throughout the country as Army and especially Air Force personnel made its hasty retreat beginning on 4 September, first in separate vehicles, then in groups and finally in disbanded columns. In the entire southern area the retreat was close to a panic, including civilian offices, Dutch Nazis, etc.

Air Force offices of all kinds, also anti-aircraft artillery units abandoned their stations and positions, whether with or without orders is unknown, generally destroying considerable supplies in the process, for example gasoline, mines, bombs, ammunition and food. The Air Force offices, for instance the anti-aircraft artillery group and the Air Force hospital, evacuated

even the Amsterdam area. Many reports came from the southern part of the area, saying that officers abandoned their men and that these were left without leadership. Personnel from naval offices from the French and Belgian area, which had been swept along or separated from their units, were noticeable only occasionally. Ship crews coming from the West and passing through appeared very exhausted. This was probably due to the long and heavy fighting of the past few weeks.

The above mentioned events had a depressing effect on our offices and troops, who were glad when things quieted down on 6 and 7 September. To the surprise of the masses fleeing from the Belgian and French areas, the defense troops of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands, i.e. of the Army as well as naval units and offices in southern and central Holland, were not caught in the panic. Naval offices were left even in such places as Bergen op Zoom, Breda, Eindhoven, Hertogenbosch, Helmond, etc., through which the retreating masses passed and where Air Force offices were carrying out much destruction at the time. The hospital at Eindhoven, for example, the Naval Ordnance Command at Bergen op Zoom and the branch offices in the places mentioned above were withdrawn only after they had completed their tasks and had salvaged all their equipment. Only the units of the Rhine Flotilla stationed there remained in the Hansweert and Wemeldinge area after the withdrawal of the Air Force. In Walcheren, on the other hand, and in Zeeland (Seelaendisch Flandern) the 2nd Naval Coastal Artillery Detachment, the 1st Naval Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment, as well as the Harbor Defense Group and the vessels of the 1st Coast Patrol Force stationed in Flushing carried on their work as before. At the same time the big operation of ferrying the 15th Army began in this area on 4 September. The responsible Army office at first estimated the number to be ferried at 30,000 men, making up three badly decimated Army Corps. In the end it turned out to be the impressive total of some 85,000 to 90,000 soldiers ferried with full equipment and arms. Here, too, the first few days were filled with unpleasant happenings as described above. But from 6 and 7 September on, the troops were handled in close formation and in an orderly fashion. Many expressed astonishment at the state of readiness evidenced by the various naval units, as well as about the exemplary leadership on the part of their officers. As the result in one case, for example, two members of the armored forces voluntarily reported to the Navy for further combat.

Berlin, 7 November 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters Wolfsschanze from 31
October to 2 November 1944.

Participants: Rear Admiral Wagner, on special duty
Lieutenant Luedde-Neurath, aide

1. 31 October 1944. 1200.

Captain von Conrady, Naval Liaison Officer attached to the General Staff Armed Forces reports to the Commander in Chief, Navy on the situation on the Eastern Front.

2. 31 October 1944. 1500.

Conference on the situation with the Fuehrer and a very small group. Only the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Admiral at Fuehrer Headquarters represent the Navy.

a. In connection with his report on laying aerial mines around the new anchorage of the TIRPITZ and the subsequent discussion on the outcome of operation "Nordlicht", the Commander in Chief, Navy announces his intention of using the coastal batteries which become available in the polar region for the purpose of strengthening the defenses of the Lofoten Islands.

The Commander in Chief is of the opinion that no large-scale landing attempts by the British are to be expected in northern Norway. Since Churchill and Stalin could reach no agreement concerning this region at the Moscow Conference, as is clearly revealed by Churchill's last speech, and since on the other hand Churchill will avoid everything which might cause friction between him and Stalin, we do not expect British action in northern Norway which would obviously be directed against Russia.

The Fuehrer does not consider this sound reasoning, since relations between Churchill and Stalin are strained in any case, and since England can only prevent Russia's advance into Norway, e.g. in the region of Narvik, by occupying that territory herself. The Fuehrer fears that the British might establish themselves in certain places in order to cut off our land and sea connections by penetrating inland. He makes special mention of the island of Andoy northwest of Harstad which, on account of its level topography, permits the construction of airfields. He considers it necessary to give the island our special attention when we strengthen our defenses.

b. The Chief of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command again suggests using submarines together with airplanes

against airplane carriers appearing along the north coast of Norway. The Commander in Chief, Navy declares that the use of submarines for this purpose is hopeless and should not be attempted.

The Fuehrer fully supports this view.

c. In his report on the war situation in the West, the Commander in Chief, Navy again points out how important it is to hold Walcheren in order to block the enemy from the Scheldt River and thereby prevent him from utilizing the harbor of Antwerp. The Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command are in complete agreement with the Commander in Chief, Navy.

d. The Commander in Chief, Navy discusses the question of exempting shipyard workers with the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, both warship and merchant shipbuilders and repair men, from conscription in the Fifth Drive and all future conscription drives. The Commander in Chief, Navy announces that the Fuehrer had already given his consent on the basis of a memorandum from the Commander in Chief, Navy (Report No. 1/Skl. Ib 32080/44 Gkdos). All that remains is to draft the final form. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command assumes the task of giving the outline the form of a Fuehrer Directive.

3. 31 October 1944. 2000.

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command is the dinner guest of the Commander in Chief, Navy in the "Haus der Marine" Commander Meyer, Major von Schimonsky, Major von John, and Lieutenant Bevermeier were also present.

4. 1 November 1944. 1530.

Conference on the situation with the Fuehrer. The Commander in Chief, Navy and the Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters are the only ones present.

a. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports that because of the threat of losing Walcheren, he had ordered an increase in small battle units in the Holland area, with special concentration in the Scheldt region. All available PT boats there will likewise be used.

b. Following the conference on the situation, the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command submit to the Fuehrer an outline of a directive for exempting shipyard workers from being drafted in the Fifth Drive and all future drives of a similar nature.

The Fuehrer gives his consent and signs the directive.

5. 1 November 1944. 1730.

There is a short discussion between the Commander in Chief, Navy and General Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command.

a. The Commander in Chief, Navy rejects the proposal for supplying the fortifications in the West by submarines, because such a measure would be ineffective. Fortifications must in the future acquire their own additional provisions by means of sorties. He suggests simultaneous sorties from Lorient and St. Nazaire in order to occupy and to exploit the area in between. Especially important supplies could, however, in exceptional cases be brought by submarine.

b. The Commander in Chief, Navy refers to the proposals of Rear Admiral Hueffmeier, Commander of Coastal Defenses, Channel Islands, who suggests prolonging the occupation of the Channel Islands until the end of 1945 by means of drastic confiscation and by severely reducing consumption. The recent assignment of Rear Admiral Hueffmeier to the additional position of Chief of Staff to the Commanding Officer of the Channel Islands is looked upon by the Commander in Chief, Navy as a happy choice and the proper way to give this energetic personality a voice in the over-all command of the Channel Islands.

6. 1 November 1944. 2000.

Reichsleiter Bormann is the dinner guest of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the "Haus der Marine".

7. 2 November 1944. 1130.

The Commander in Chief, Navy has a conversation with Minister Speer.

8. 2 November 1944. 1530.

There is a conference on the situation with the Fuehrer; the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters are the sole participants.

9. 2 November 1944. 1815.

The Commander in Chief, Navy has an interview with the Fuehrer.

10. 2 November 1944. 1930.

Major General (SS) Fegelein has an interview with the Commander in Chief, Navy concerning questions of command.

11. 2 November 1944. 2000.

Departure.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Pfeiffer

1 December 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy with the Fuehrer on 28 November 1944 at 1530
at the Reich Chancellery.

At the conference on the situation with the Fuehrer, the following questions concerning naval warfare came up for discussion:

1. The effect of the loss of the Svorbe Peninsula on the war situation in Kurland. With Svorbe eliminated as an obstacle, the possibility of Russian landings along the coast of Kurland increases. The Commander in Chief, Navy submits a plan to the Fuehrer, showing the disposition of the coastal batteries in Kurland. All work necessary to prepare them for action has just been completed.

The Commander in Chief, Navy suggests that the Army should now build a considerable number of emergency piers (Stichbruecken) on the west and particularly the east coast of Kurland, because the ports alone cannot handle the amount of shipping necessary, particularly since they will be more and more subject to air attacks. Furthermore, the situation may develop in such a way that the ports will not be available for our use at all.

The Commander in Chief, Navy intends to discuss this question personally with the Chief of the General Staff, Army, who is not present today.

2. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports to the Fuehrer that he is somewhat worried about the effectiveness of our own mines, since reports of self-detonations of German mines that have torn loose from their moorings are quite frequent. To be sure, the latest aerial photographs and reports of the enemy press seem to indicate that the enemy has not made very much headway in clearing away the mines in the Scheldt region. Thus the mines have held him up longer than the Commander in Chief, Navy anticipated, i.e. since the loss of Walcheren on 11 November, 18 days to date. This may be attributable to the use of different combinations and types of mines and firing mechanisms.

The Fuehrer requests a list of the mines used, indicating type of fuze and setting.

3. During the discussion of the situation in Norway, the Commander in Chief, Navy makes reference to the Navy's proposal to retain a few coastal batteries with the necessary infantry protection in front of the Lyngen position. Their purpose would be to make it more difficult for the enemy to occupy these important fjord regions, especially since only small Norwegian forces have fought there so far, the Russians having withdrawn again behind the Finnish frontier. In the opinion of the Navy, the region of the Altenfjord and Hammerfest are well suited for such an enterprise.

The Fuehrer gives approval to this measure.

4. In regard to the transfer of troops from Norway to Denmark, the Commander in Chief, Navy reports that shipping space is not causing any concern. Enough is available to handle the number of troops as they are brought to the embarkation points by rail. The length of time it will take to transfer the troops is much more dependent on the weather, on enemy interference and on the limited number of escort vessels.

5. In the discussion of possible enemy landings in Holland, the Commander in Chief, Navy stated that conditions at present are not favorable for a landing in that area. He pointed out, however, that according to the reports on hand, several British divisions are assembling in the area south of the Thames, and that the influx of enemy troops to the Western Front will increase considerably after the Scheldt River becomes navigable. The Fuehrer confirms this view.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Lt. Neumann

1 December 1944

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference on the Situation with the Fuehrer, attended by the Commander in Chief, Navy on 30 November 1944 at 1600.

I. Before the conference, the Commander in Chief, Navy had a talk with the Chief of Operations Staff, Army General Staff, Major General Wenck, in the absence of the Chief of the General Staff himself. He pointed out to Major General Wenck the increased danger of enemy landings in Kurland since the fall of the Svorbe Peninsula. He informed him about the mining of the Irbe Strait, completed except for a gap off the coast of Kurland. He suggested that the Army General Staff issue orders to Army Group North to have their engineers build temporary piers along the coast of Kurland, especially along the east coast, in consultation with the local naval commands. The purpose of this precautionary measure is to be able to cope with any situation arising in case the ports along the west coast become overcrowded, are too greatly endangered, or are actually lost. In spite of such possible reverses, these piers would enable us to continue supply shipments or, if necessary, to evacuate troops. The east coast must not be neglected. Because of the prevailing west winds, it is possible to embark or disembark troops on the open coast only on the east side.

II. During the conference, the following questions concerning naval warfare came up for discussion:

1. With reference to the situation in the West, the Fuehrer stresses the great importance of transferring the 6th SS Mountain Division and the 2nd Mountain Division, together approximately 36,000 men, quickly from Oslo to Aalborg. In this connection, the Commander in Chief, Navy reports that no congestion has so far occurred in Oslo, except for about 14,000 troops on leave or otherwise returning home, who must wait until these divisions have been shipped. The eleven transports assigned, together approximately 50,000 BRT, are adequate to take care of the combat troops arriving at the rate of six trains per day. In addition, thirty coastal motor ships left Holland a week ago. These will increase the transport facilities and help to reduce the congestion.

2. The Commander in Chief, Navy refers once more to the serious threat to German shipping along the Norwegian coast, and to the great losses we incur there, primarily inflicted upon us by the enemy air forces. Unless we can guarantee adequate air reconnaissance against enemy aircraft, aircraft carriers and surface forces, the time will not be far off when ship movements in this region will come to a complete standstill.

The Fuehrer agrees with this view. He stresses the importance

of constructing railroads along the northern coast of Norway as substitutes for sea traffic, emphasizing their comparative safety from air attacks due to the fact that one third of the distance is through tunnels, and the remainder mostly along high mountains. Then he discusses the necessity of forceful measures to be taken by the Air Force against attacking airplane carriers and naval forces.

3. In connection with Churchill's claim, which is unsubstantiated as yet, to be sure, that the first convoys have arrived in Antwerp, the Chief of Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command emphasizes that the Air Force and the Navy must take all possible measures in order to disrupt these enemy supply shipments, not to mention the bombardment of Antwerp with V-1's and V-2's. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports to the Fuehrer that two PT boat flotillas were sent on mine-laying missions in the West Scheldt the night before, and another PT boat flotilla on a torpedo mission west of the Scheldt. He again requests that Antwerp and the Scheldt River be photographed from the air, so that he may get a true picture of the situation. Brigadier General Christian, the representative of the Chief of the Air Force General Staff, received orders to that effect.

III. Following the conference on the situation, the Commander in Chief, Navy informs the Fuehrer that he was asked to address the German-Japanese Society at its next meeting and asks the Fuehrer's permission to do so. This is granted.

IV. As the result of the over-all picture presented at the conference on the situation with the Fuehrer, the Navy at this time should concentrate its efforts on the following tasks:

1. The fast and safe transfer of the combat divisions from Norway, which is sufficiently important to justify exposing the escort vessels, i.e. cruisers EMDEN and KOELN, to greater risk.

2. The fight against enemy movements on the Scheldt River, which must be carried on with all means that can be made available.

signed: Doenitz

countersigned: Lt. Neumann

Naval Staff

Minutes of the Conference of the Commander in Chief,
Navy with the Fuehrer on 3 December 1944.

I. 3 December 1944. 1600.

The Commander in Chief, Navy attends the conference on the situation with the Fuehrer. He is accompanied by the Admiral on Special Duty.

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy reports to the Fuehrer his decision to station seven submarines, the only ones equipped with the Schnorchel device available in that region, outside Scapa Flow for attacks on entering carrier task forces. In reply to the Fuehrer's question whether it is correct to assume that Scapa Flow is the base for carrier task forces, the Commander in Chief, Navy states that in all probability such is the case, although he has no definite proof.

2. During the discussion of the possibility of shipping the entire equipment of the combat divisions to be evacuated from Norway directly to Denmark by sea, and to transport only the personnel by train to Oslo and from there by boat to Denmark, the Commander in Chief, Navy makes the following comment:

It takes about ninety shiploads of 3,000 BRT each, or a total of 270,000 BRT to transport 12,856 horses and 11,251 vehicles and guns by sea. Since all shipping space is in use, this would mean that 400,000 freight tons of important goods, such as army equipment, ore and pyrite, could not be moved. Little time would actually be saved in view of the time required for loading, not to mention possible delays due to the weather and enemy interference. Escort forces are insufficient to afford sufficient protection for these extensive shipping operations in addition to their other tasks, such as escorting supply convoys, anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping. Great losses must therefore be expected.

The Commander in Chief, Navy proposes that twenty ships of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping be assigned to this task, and that the remaining equipment be transported to Oslo by rail as was previously suggested.

The Fuehrer agrees with this proposal and directs that the equipment to be transported by sea should be chosen on the following basis: the most bulky goods, which take up the most space on the train, in other words all types of vehicles, should go by water. In view of the risk involved in transportation by sea, such vehicles should be chosen which can most easily be replaced, that is, approximately in the following order: horsedrawn vehicles, passenger cars, trucks.

The Chief, Armed Forces, Operations Staff is directed to work out a corresponding priority list.

In addition, the Fuehrer orders that for the time being only those vehicles should be shipped which are indispensable to the divisions for combat purposes, while the rest should be left behind for shipment at a later date, when the situation is less critical.

II. 3 December 1944. 1730.

Private conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer.

Aside from certain personal matters, the following points were discussed:

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy voices his intention of sending ten to fifteen German naval officers to Japan, giving them the opportunity to become acquainted with naval warfare on a large scale by participating in fleet operations there. Their experiences could later be utilized to build up a German fleet. Since German naval warfare, with the exception of submarine warfare, has developed into a purely coastal war, we have no opportunity whatsoever to acquire experience of this nature in the European theater.

The Fuehrer agrees.

2. The Commander in Chief, Navy submits to the Fuehrer the report of Lt. Commander Nollmann, who was in charge of a submarine equipped with a Schnorchel in its operations off the east coast of Scotland. Nollmann speaks in the most positive manner about the great possibilities of this ship and states the conviction of his crew that with the introduction of the Schnorchel the old effectiveness of the submarine has been re-established.

In view of this very favorable evaluation of the Schnorchel submarine, corroborated also in other instances, the Commander in Chief, Navy has no misgivings about the new submarine models, which will be equipped even better for underwater warfare. He believes that the revival of submarine warfare will be chiefly a home and shipyard problem, since the enemy will concentrate all his efforts on the outbound routes of the submarines, their construction and repair yards, as well as their bases, as soon as the first successes of the new submarines become known. While other industries can be moved to less endangered regions, the shipbuilding industry is by its nature confined to the coast and the large ports, and nothing can take its place elsewhere. The Commander in Chief, Navy refers the Fuehrer to the memorandum submitted about the middle of November concerning the armament situation of the naval forces, and emphasizes that everything possible must be done to force through the Navy shipbuilding program. He fears, however, that Hauptamtsleiter Saur of the Ministry of Armaments and War Industries will be under such pressure on account of numerous special programs of other branches of the Armed Forces ordered by the Fuehrer, that the shipbuilding program may easily suffer. It is felt that under the circumstances, the influence of the Commander in Chief, Navy is insufficient to protect the interests of the Navy. He therefore solicits the aid of the Fuehrer to impress Mr. Saur with the needs of the Navy. Unless everything possible is done

in this respect, the new submarine arm will by necessity turn out to be a bad investment.

The Fuehrer agrees with the argument of the Commander in Chief, Navy and indicates that he might approach Mr. Saur regarding the matter.

3. As for the propaganda angle of submarine warfare, the Commander in Chief, Navy proposes to lull the enemy into a state of security and not to inform the public at first of our successes, in order not to provoke countermeasures on the part of the enemy prematurely.

The Fuehrer agrees.

signed: Doenitz

GLOSSARY 1944

A.M.F.P. (Artillerie-Marinefaehrprahm)

A landing craft type of vessel converted to serve as a floating artillery battery.

Army Group E

German Army Group in the southern Balkans and the Aegean area.

Bormann

Martin Bormann performed the duties of Deputy Fuehrer, even though the office of Deputy to the Fuehrer had been abolished after Hess' flight in 1941. He also was Chief of the Nazi Party Chancellory and a member of the important Ministers' Council for the Defense of Germany. Towards the end of the war he became one of the most powerful men in Germany.

Box model values

In their experiments with various explosives the Germans used steel boxes simulating ships' hulls. The size of the gap torn in the wall of the box served as a measure of the effectiveness of the explosive tested.

DM-Mine (Druckmagnet-Mine)

A mine equipped with a combined pressure unit and magnetic firing device.

Electro submarine (Elektro-U-Boot)

Believed to be the interim name of a type in which the electric drive was increased by additional batteries.

Fifth Drive

One of several special drafts for the Armed Forces, in which war workers in deferred categories were called up for military service.

FK weapons

FK probably stands for "Fernlenkkoerper", i.e. guided missile.

G7e

Designation of a German naval torpedo, seven meters in length and 534 millimeters (21 inches) in diameter. It was electrically propelled.

G7e Lut

A G7e torpedo with a Lut figure-running mechanism. See Lut.

Gauleiter

Leader of one of the 42 Nazi Party administrative regions.

GRAF SPEE

Reference is made here to the engagement the pocket battleship GRAF SPEE had with the heavy British cruiser EXETER and the light cruisers AJAX and ACHILLES 13 December 1939 off the coast of Uruguay. German military opinion criticized the commander of the GRAF SPEE for changing over to defensive tactics at the critical moment of the battle, when greater aggressiveness would allegedly have led to better results. The GRAF SPEE was scuttled by her own crew 17 December 1939 just outside the harbor of Montevideo.

Grossi

Captain Grossi, commander of the Italian submarines based at Bordeaux, France, and his subordinates sided with the Germans after the capitulation of Italy.

Group A

In connection with the activation of the Naval Emergency Units late in 1943, all shore establishments, headquarters, schools, etc. of the Navy, from which personnel for such units was to be drawn, were divided into three categories: Those of comparatively minor importance to the war effort, whose personnel consequently was to be called up first, were designated as Group A; those of comparatively greater importance were designated as Group B; and those of vital importance were designated as Group C. See also Naval Emergency Unit.

Hauptamtsleiter Saur

Karl Otto Saur was head of the Technical Bureau (Amt Technik) in Speer's Ministry of Armaments and War Production. As such he had extensive powers over the German and German-controlled heavy industries, especially the iron and steel industries. His title of "Hauptamtsleiter" denotes a function in the Nazi Party, not in the German government service. In 1944 Saur also headed the so-called "Jaegerstab". See Jaegerstab.

Hydrogenation plant

This refers to the production of motor fuels by the hydrogenation and liquefaction of coal, whereby pulverized coal is treated with hydrogen under high pressure.

Jaegerstab

This organization was established early in 1944 in consequence of the massed air attacks against German aircraft production. It directed the dispersion and eastward movement of German aircraft production facilities. Adequate priority was given to this program as well as to the creation of a strong German fighter force. In July 1944 further production of bomber and transport aircraft was discontinued, and such production replaced by an increased output of fighters. On 1 August the functions and responsibilities of the "Jaegerstab" passed into the competence of another body known as the "Ruestungsstab".

J.K.H.(R) (Jagd Kanonen Haubitze, Russisch)
A Russian or Russian-type gun used by the Germans.

KASSEL

On 5 June 1944 the German war-transport KASSEL entered the Bosphorus en route from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. She was stopped and searched by the Turkish authorities in order to establish her character. When it was found that the ship was, in fact, a camouflaged warship, passage through the Straits was denied under the provisions of the Montreux Convention, and the ship turned back to the Black Sea. The KASSEL incident precipitated a political crisis in Turkey because of the fact that other ships of the same type had previously been allowed to pass through the Straits freely. As a result the pro-German Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu was forced to resign. The Germans feared that Turkey might enter the war on the side of the Allies in the event of another such incident.

Koralle

Name of a Navy camp located at Bernau, a short distance northeast of Berlin. In 1944 the Commander in Chief, Navy, much of the Naval Staff, and other sections of the Naval High Command had their headquarters there.

KT-ships (Kriegstransportschiffe)

German war-transports. They were cargo vessels averaging about 800 tons in size and carrying a cargo of 350 to 400 tons.

Kuepfmueller

Professor Kuepfmueller was head of the Scientific Staff of the German Navy (Wissenschaftlicher Fuehrungsstab der Kriegsmarine).

Group "Landwirt"

A group of German submarines standing by in the Bay of Biscay in June 1944 to prevent or combat an invasion of France from that direction.

Lut (Lageunabhaengigkeitstorpedo)

A torpedo equipped with the Lut course-setting mechanism was so constructed as to run straight ahead for a predetermined distance. It would then start on a pattern run, proceeding on a previously selected mean course. This arrangement enabled the submarine to attack from virtually any position.

Mercator submarines

Cover name for a group of ex-Italian transport submarines, their official designations being U It 21-25. These boats, which had a carrying capacity of 150 tons each, were engaged in commerce with the Japanese-dominated Far East. They were taken over by the Germans after the capitulation of Italy.

Minister Speer

Albert Speer was Minister of Armament and War Production. As such his powers over every phase of German economic life were very extensive.

Ministerialdirektor

Administrative official holding high position in a ministry. The Ministerialdirektor was immediately subordinate to an Undersecretary (Staatssekretaer) and was the head of a department (Abteilung).

Ministerialdirektor Dorsch

Xaver Dorsch was one of the most outstanding engineers of the Todt Organization (see O.T.) and its responsible head since 1942. When the Todt Organization was combined with the Office of Construction in Speer's Ministry of Armament and War Production in 1944, Dorsch became head of the resulting new organization called "Amt Bau - O.T.". As such he was in charge of all construction both in Germany and in the occupied countries.

Mohr

A small battle weapon, known to have been in the developmental stage in February - March 1944. It seems to have resembled the "Neger" and "Marder". Information about this weapon is very scanty and no particulars are available at present. See One-man torpedo.

Naval Emergency Unit

Fuehrer directive No. 51 called for the mobilization of non-combat naval personnel for front-line duty, in anticipation of the threatened Allied invasion of Western Europe. Shore installations, training schools, headquarters, and other such establishments had to organize part of their personnel into emergency units. Men so designated would continue with their normal duties until their group was called up, which was not to be the case until an invasion was considered imminent. They were to be trained and equipped for land warfare in the meantime.

"Nashorn" mine fields

A system of anti-submarine mine barriers, designed to keep Russian submarines from breaking out into the Baltic. It extended across the Gulf of Finland from the vicinity of the island of Nargen on the Estonian side to the area of Porkalla on the Finnish side.

Neger

A one-man torpedo consisting of two 21 inch electric torpedoes, one secured above the other and about six inches apart. The lower one was the live torpedo. The "Neger" was the first type of one-man torpedo to be used in action. See One-man torpedo.

Nordlicht

Code name for the evacuation of German troops from Northern Finland and Northern Norway, occasioned by the Finnish capitulation.

Oberregierungsrat

High civil service administrative official, usually in charge of an administrative department.

One-man torpedo

The one-man torpedo consisted of an upper part, the carrier, with either one or two explosive torpedoes attached to its bottom. Originally the carrier and the explosive torpedoes were of equal size and shape, the carrier being, in fact, a converted torpedo itself. In later models the carrier was of special construction and developed into something like a midget submarine. The pilot, seated in the carrier, had the task of steering the device close enough to the target to make a hit probable. He would then release the explosive torpedo by means of an electro-magnetic mechanism, whereupon the carrier would turn away and try to return to a friendly shore. Several types, such as "Marder I" (probably identical with "Neger"), "Marder II", "Molch", and "Seeteufel" were developed in 1944 and 1945.

Organization Kaltenbrunner

Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was in charge of Himmler's Central Reich Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). In mid-summer 1944 this organization assumed control of the bulk of the intelligence organization of the Armed Forces, the new intelligence service thus formed being known under the name of "Militaerisches Amt". It is believed that the latter operated in close collaboration with the "Security Service" (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrers SS), which was also a branch of the Central Reich Security Office.

O.T. (Organisation Todt)

Todt Organization. A construction organization, named for the founder, which built the German motor speedways, the West Wall, and the Atlantic fortifications. It employed domestic and foreign labor on military projects both in Germany and in the occupied countries.

PQ

Designation of convoys proceeding eastward from the United Kingdom to Northern Russia.

QP

Designation of convoys returning to the United Kingdom from Northern Russia.

Reichsfuehrer SS

Title of Heinrich Himmler in his capacity as chief of the SS stormtroopers.

Reichsleiter

The highest rank in the Nazi Party. The individuals holding this rank formed the highest executive board of the Nazi Party. Most of them also held high positions in the Reich government.

Reichsmarschall

"Reichsmarschall" was a rank created especially for Goering. No other person in Germany held this military title.

Replacement Army

The German Army was divided into the Field Army (Feldheer) and the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer). Each major unit in the Field Army had a counterpart of smaller size in the Replacement Army; this affiliated replacement unit was charged with training replacements for its parent unit so as to keep the latter up to regulation strength at all times. Due to the gradual depletion of German manpower, this system became more and more diluted during the war, but was never changed fundamentally. After July 1944, the Replacement Army was under the command of Heinrich Himmler.

Replacement reserves (Ersatzreservisten)

Untrained reserves; as over against ordinary reserves (Reservisten), who have had some military training.

Sauckel

As Commissioner General for the Mobilization of Labor, Fritz Sauckel was in charge of the allocation and mobilization of labor in the interest of the German war effort.

SCHARNHORST

On 26 December 1943 a German task force, consisting of the battleship SCHARNHORST and five destroyers attempted to attack a convoy en route from the United Kingdom to Northern Russia. It was intercepted by a British task force consisting of the battleship DUKE OF YORK, four cruisers, and several destroyers. In the ensuing engagement the SCHARNHORST was sunk. The engagement took place in the Barents Sea.

Schnorchel

An extensible intake-exhaust tube which, when upright (attached to the side of the conning tower), enabled the submarine to use its Diesel engines although almost completely submerged. The only portion of the submarine exposed was the top of the tube, and this was usually covered with an anti-radar material.

SE-Aktion (Sondereinberufungsaktion)

Special draft for workers in deferred categories. See Fifth Drive.

Seehund

A two-man midget submarine carrying two torpedoes.

Special Troop Service

Until 1944, administrative personnel of the German Armed Forces normally were Armed Forces Officials. At that time those in important positions of the administrative service were organized into a new category of officers in the Special Troop Service (Truppenonderdienst).

Sperrverband

A unit formed with the specific purpose of blocking the Allied advance into Germany. Many such units were formed in the latter part of 1944.

TA plus number (Torpedoboot Ausland)

Denotes a torpedo boat of foreign origin, i.e. ex-French, ex-Italian, etc.

Tanne Ost

Code name for the proposed occupation of the island of Hogland in the Gulf of Finland in the event of an armistice between Finland and Russia, so as to prevent its falling into Russian hands. The operation failed due to unexpectedly stubborn Finnish resistance.

Type XXI

A long-range ocean-going submarine. It was 245 feet in length, prefabricated. It had a well streamlined hull, and was capable of great underwater speed. It had normal (Diesel-electric) submarine propulsion. Some boats of this type served as transport submarines.

Type XXIII

A short-range coastal submarine, 100 feet in length, prefabricated, and capable of great underwater speed. It carried only two torpedoes. Type XXIII was a smaller version of Type XXI, both types having been developed simultaneously and under the same direction.

V 1

A long-range piloted or automatically controlled ground-to-ground or air-to-ground jet-propelled missile. It was directed against strategic centers in the Allies' rear, such as London and Antwerp. Also known as FZG 76.

V 2

A long-range ground-to-ground rocket-propelled guided missile, directed against strategic centers in the Allies' rear. Also known as A 4.

Wallenstein

"Wallenstein" was the code signal notifying the German fleet that the Allied invasion of Europe had begun. That meant that all ships were to get ready for action without delay and remain in a state of combat readiness until further notice. Other pre-arranged plans went into effect simultaneously.

Walter submarine

A submarine designed by the Walter firm in Kiel. It was distinguished by the addition of a turbine drive to the standard Diesel and electrical drives. The turbines were to be driven by a fuel obtained from the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide and were to give the submarine a high underwater speed. In addition, the hull was completely streamlined.