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By authority A. C. of S., G-2

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REPORT FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL BRANCH ISSUED BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT, BY COMBINED PERSONNEL OF U.S. AND BRITISH SERVICES FOR USE OF ALLIED FORCES.

Information obtained from Colonel Edgar Petersen of the G.A.F. Allied source. Received in Britain 20 July 1945.

I THE G.A.F.
II U.S. BOMBING TARGETS.
III JET AIRCRAFT.

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NOTE: Colonel Petersen's long career in the G.A.F. included periods as Kommodore of K.G. 40 (Wing Commander, Fighter Wing 40), and as C.O. of the Kommando der Erprobungsstellen (Testing Stations Command), [redacted], Rechlin. While he no doubt deserves the reputation he enjoyed in the G.A.F., as a man better employed on missions for K.G.40 than as responsible head of the G.A.F. testing organization, his position in both capacities gave him the opportunity for an objective view of the Luftwaffe which would have been impossible to the more academic type of specialist, and it is felt that his observations may therefore be of value.

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I THE G.A.F.

The chief effects of the inauguration and continuance of American Air operations over Europe were: (a) to force a change from the offensive to the defensive with a dis-continuation of the bomber programme and an increase in the fighter programme; and (b) that the aircraft industry had to be widely dispersed with a consequent drop in production. The Germans first realized that the A.A.F. intended intensive operations over Europe in the summer of 1943. With the fall of Sicily it was obvious that targets in the South of the Reich would come within range of concentrated American attacks.

The immediate countermeasures should have been a vast increase in fighter strength. In December 1943, however, Hitler would hear nothing which savoured of defensive warfare and actually ordered that fighter strength should be reduced in favour of He.177 production. It was not until June/July 1944 that this incredible decision was reversed and an attempt to increase fighter strength was begun. But no direct modification of aircraft types and armament resulted because types had been changing for the whole of the preceding year, i.e. the 262 and 163 were already replacing s/e fighters. These new types however were not fully operational or even fully into production by the middle of 1944 when Hitler finally agreed to increase the fighter programme.

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Dispositions of operational fighter units among the three fronts were determined theoretically, by Goering, in consultation with the O.K.L. (GAF High Command), but in practice by Goering alone. The Reichsmarschall's ideas were almost invariably counter to those of the O.K.L. but he generally got his way. Criticism of Goering's lack of foresight and general inefficiency was widespread and often there were people like Galland who were outspoken and bitter in the extreme. I do not myself know exactly when the Luftwaffe first drew fighter units from the other fronts for use in the West against the A.A.F.

In the summer of 1943 Hauptmann Geyer had a Staffel of F.W.190s and Me.109s at Achmer as an Erprobungskommando - (Testing Unit). These aircraft were fitted with 21 cm. rockets and apart from their experimental test flights they conducted operational attacks on 4-engined bombers with this weapon. I have no precise knowledge concerning the number of squadrons which may have used the 21 cm. rocket, nor can I identify any of them. The use of this rocket was abandoned in the summer of 1944 for two main reasons - (1) the American fighter escort, primarily Mustangs, were faster than the German aircraft fitted with rockets - (2) German single-seater fighters were at a disadvantage in calculating the distances between themselves and the bombing formation. Had they been equipped with search apparatus for computing distances, the amount of additional weight would almost certainly have demanded a two-seater airframe. The question of why the GAF did not make greater use of the Me.410 is bied up with the evolution of the 410 from the 210. The original Me.210 had wing slots cut, on the orders of the R.L.M. (Air Ministry), the wing slots were abandoned. This caused great difficulty in landing the aircraft and in any case it had a very high wing loading and a tendency to spin. After tests at Rechlin, the 210 was modified and slots re-introduced. At the same time, the fuselage was lengthened and the engines were changed to 603s, the final result embodying these changes was named the 410. As this turned out, however, it proved to be too small for the weight of gasoline required to give the aircraft the needed range of activity. It also had a comparatively low rated altitude, and it was not fast enough for American s/e fighters.

I do not know of any figure of losses on the German side which it was felt it would be necessary to incur to terminate American bombing. On the American side it was generally held that if we could cause the Americans 20% loss, a cessation of American attacks would probably result.

I have seen no statistics of percentage losses incurred by the GAF in combat with the American Air Force but General Galland once told me that 60 German fighters had been shot down out of a total of 3/400; otherwise all I know is contained in the official German communiques, which are on record. The individual use of drop tanks by our planes goes back quite a way; but they were first used extensively about April 1943. I am not entirely sure when the German fighters first started drawing back from bases along the Channel coast line; I believe it was in the autumn of 1943, and I have no knowledge of why the decision was taken. Nor have I any idea why the German fighters never defended the V weapon sites.

The idea of the "Baby Blitz" on London early in 1944 was entirely Hitler's and the O.K.L. and Goering were against it. Hitler originally intended that it should start in December 1943 but technical difficulties caused its postponement until January. K.G.40 and K.G.100 had spent a

long time converting to Hs.293 and both units were not a little discouraged when they were ordered back to ordinary bombing. The removal of Hs.293 equipment and the neces[illegible] part of the reason [illegible]

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long time converting to Hs.293 and both units were not a little discouraged when they were ordered back to ordinary bombing. The removal of Hs.293 equipment and the necessary re-organization was part of the reason for the postponement. The whole idea behind the raids was psychological, Hitler's idea being that terror could only be combated with terror. Concerning plane losses, or numbers participating in the attacks against Allied airfields on 1 January 1945, I have no information.

At the beginning of 1944 when the Allies began to use Italian bases it became obvious that a shuttle service with Russian bases was the next logical step. Whether German intelligence had any exact foreknowledge of Allied intentions I do not know.

What readjustments in our Flak may have been necessitated by the advent of high altitude daylight bombers is a matter outside my province, but I do know that the introduction of rockets and the group firing of several A.A. guns, or rockets, or both together, was introduced. Our A.A. personnel was considerably augmented when day bombing started, though I can give no definite figures.

The reasons why more intruder operations were not tried over A.A.F. bases in England are fairly complicated and involve consideration of the extremely efficient fighter defense of England, British R.D.F., and really excellent fighter control. In order to attack American bases in England, it would have been necessary for German aircraft to carry extra tanks to an extent at which the superiority in speed of Allied fighters would have become critical. With such a position obtaining, day attacks on American airfields were out of the question, and towards the end of the war, the gasoline situation excluded the whole possibility anyway.

German success in the Poltava affair appears to have been due to maximum concentration of effort within the shortest time, the use of flares for marking, and the extensive employment of small anti-personnel bombs in addition to incendiaries. In the West, by the time the American air forces had acquired continental bases, the G.A.F. was in a very poor state alike as to machines, pilots and gasoline. Our shortages were such that we could not keep up any sustained effort, and it was useless to nibble at the problem of low level attacks against U.S. fighter-bomber bases on the Continent. So far as the Allies are concerned, in my own opinion, there were no targets which they might advantageously have attacked yet neglected to do so.

We ourselves were unable to develop a large fighter-bomber force with planes of the FW 190 Type because absolutely every aircraft available was required as a fighter pure and simple. Let me here briefly sum up the history of the German 9th Air Corps, and 9th Air Division, and add a few remarks on the part played by General Pelz in relation to our jet programme. To the best of my knowledge Flieger Korps 9 and Flieger Division 9 were one and the same, the latter being the term in use latterly. It was under the command of General Göhler (pronounced Söhler). The unit was originally designated Flieger Korps 9 sometime in 1941 when it was under the command of Frölich, being engaged in mining sorties as well as night attacks on England. Towards the end of 1943 Pelz became O.C. of Flieger Korps 9 with the title "Angriffsführer England" (Assault Leader for England). In this capacity Pelz remained until attacks on England collapsed completely when most of the personnel of the unit were drafted into the paratroops, and its pilots transferred to jet aircraft. Pelz was persona grata with Goering and when the Reichs Verteidigung (Defense

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of the Reich) programme was proposed Pelz was given the organization of Flieger Korps 9. Later Pelz's pilots were given preference for re-training on to the Me.262 and this caused some friction with Galland whose Me.262 pilots were rightly or wrongly regarded as fine weather flyers. I cannot say whether Pelz's pilots were more successful than Galland's or not.

More than once an all-out fighter attack on deep enemy strategic penetrations was attempted. The organization of the Luftwaffe however was such that the attacks were badly co-ordinated, badly led, and the individual aircraft generally failed to make proper rendezvous. Later, the shortage of aircraft and gasoline ruled out even an attempt at an all out attack. Available strength for such an effort would have been, I should say, 500 or more aircraft. Incidentally the German intention certainly envisaged that the R4M rocket was to be used very extensively, and was to be fitted in every German fighter, - probably under the wings.

(Continued on Page 5.)

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II. U.S. Bombing Targets.

We unquestionably realised that the Americans had definite plans for the systematic selection of targets but I cannot say when this realization first came. An analysis of attacks soon showed that the main targets which were being systematically selected were oil producing works and refineries, ball bearing industries and railway stations and airfields. There was a definite German defensive system for the defence of certain vital targets, e.g. the concentration of Me. 163 forces and heavy A.A. round oil producing centres such as at Politz which had at least 80 A.A. batteries. As far as I know there was never any plan to defend certain selected targets to the complete neglect of others. Prior to the summer of 1944 the effects of American attacks on the aircraft industry were mainly local and although this had caused a certain amount of dispersal with consequent drop in production it was not until the beginning of the summer of 1944 that lasting effects apreared.

In 1941/42 it was decided to increase the fighter programme. The then average monthly production of 360 fighters was to step up successively to 500 and 700 monthly. Further decisions to increase this programme were made, and by November 1943 the combined output of all the programmes then embarked on should have given 3,000 fighters per month. This goal however was modified to 2,000 per month in order to produce a number of bombers as a concession to HITLER's demands for offensive warfare. Even this figure of 2,000 per month was further reduced in December 1943 to 1,500. These of course are the programme fighres and they were quite certainly never attained in actual aircraft production. Of the actual production figures I have no details. Up to July 1944 the Air Forces had only third priority in the armament programme and it was not until the last attempt at increased fighter production was made that the G.A.F. again enjoyed first priority. I believe that in Jahuary/February 1945, 2,000 fighters per month were being produced.

I believe it was recognized in the autumn of 1943 after the attack on Ploesti that German oil supplies had become the main Allied objective. But this shift of policy did not allow us full recovery to a satisfactory ball bearing position. The ball bearing industry was never pursed back to its original position, but it was restored to something like a satisfactory state on a modified scale. The attack on Friedrichshafen exerted a very great influence on the ball bearing situation. There was no industry which could have been more effectively attacked than oil from the Allied point of view - primary targets from the very beginning should have been oil, oil and more oil!

III - Jet Aircraft.

The Me. 262 should have gone into series production about August 1943 and was to become operational as a bomber in May/June 1944. The Ar. 234 was to be a few months behind the Me. 262. The Ar. 234 actually flew as a reconnaissance aircraft in September 1944. Roughly about the same time three prototypes of the He. 280 were tested; but the whole He. 280 project was dropped because speed, climbing power, and other factors were quite unsatisfactory. The Heinkel turbine for example with which the He. 280 was fitted was not powerful enough, and the Jumo 004 could not be made to fit under the wings. The Me. 163 was projected for series production in the summer of 1943 but only came into operation in the autumn of 1944. Prior to the autumn of 1944 isolated aircraft of course had been put up against Allied bombers chiefly by an Me. 163 Erprobungskommando (Testing Unit) in Zwischenahn.

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Attacks on aircraft plants certainly delayed the operational employment of jet aircraft, but I have no details in the matter. With the Me 163 technical difficulties alone accounted for delays in bringing it out. I do not believe the 163 suffered in favour of the 262, or that differences of opinion between LIPPISCH and MESSERSCHMITT entered into the question. Daylight bombing indubitably caused the German leaders to make an effort at accelerating the jet programme.

The ultimate employment of the Me. 262 was not decided on any technical or operational grounds, but solely on the basis of the bee in HITLER's bonnet that the 262 was a bomber and nothing else. This became such a touchy topic that an order was issued promising dire consequences for anybody who was heard referring to the 262 as a fighter. As already mentioned, a small number of 163s undergoing tests at Zwischenahn were used operationally to a very small extent. Zwischenahn was the most westerly airfield used; but the 163 required such a strong ground organisation that its efficient employment operationally could only take place from airfields sufficiently interior to be safe from attack. There was however, some actual use of French bases for jet planes, - Chateaudun, Orleans and Jouvincourt were all prepared for the 262. These airfields were to be operated by a Sonder-kommando (Special Unit) under Major SCHENK. SCHENK did actually operate Me. 262s from these airfields for a short time after D-Day.

The Me. 262 required 1,000/1,400 metres runway (30% less with assisted take off). The requirements of the Ar. 234 are practically identical. The Ar. 234 was first used as a bomber in the autumn of 1944. Prior to this a few recce sorties over England (late summer) had been flown and these were extremely successful. The Me. 262 was never used as a reconnaissance plane, although it might well have been. At 6,000 metres at 850 k.p.h. there could have been little allied interference. With none of the jet models were there any special problems from a piloting point of view, it only required training and general technical understanding of jets on the part of the pilot. PELZ's bomber pilots were used for the Me. 262 but like other air crews they suffered in the general exodus of personnel to the paratroops.

Planned production of the various jet types was as follows:-

Me. 163 - 50 per month.
Me. 262 - 1,000 per month.
Ar. 234 - 1-200 per month.

Actual production was:-

Me. 163 - the theoretical figure was approximately reached in January, but thereafter nothing was produced.
Me. 262 - 120 per month.
Ar. 234 - owing to the fact that the Russians over-ran the manufacturing centres of production, could hardly have been more than 10 per month.

Resort to underground factories had very little effect on production rates for jet machines, because it was undertaken too late. The extensive building of underground factories in time would have had very far reaching results. Critical shortages, primarily of fuel, but also of ball bearings, and some metal parts, undoubtedly held up the operational development of jet-propelled craft. As regards the relative merits of different jet-propulsion power units, the Jumo 004 was considerably more reliable than the BMW 003, the latter being liable to cut out at height. The 004 also had a bigger thrust. The turbine of the future however is the 011 which has a bigger thrust than either of the others and weighs considerably less.

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The fuel used by jets, designated J.2, is an intermediate product in the final production of gasoline. Its production is cheaper than that of gasoline, as two or three of the final manufacturing processes are avoided. There has been some speculation concerning the theory of armament for the Me. 262. As far as I am able to understand the question thus posed, the answer seems to be as follows: The original armament for the Me. 262 was to have been 4 M.K. 108s, but this was abandoned in favour or 6 M.G. 151s. Experiments were carried out with 2 M.K. 103s plus 2 M.G. 151s but this was never operational. Further experiments were also done with a single 50 mm., or 55 mm., cannon. Operations had also been carried out with the R4M rockets, 12 under each wing, but this had not become standard. There were never any particular difficulties with the conventional armament mentioned above except the usual difficulties of belt feed when firing in a steep turn.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

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